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REVISITING THE NONINSURABLE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS
CATHERINE M. SuARKEY*
ABSTRACT
This Article offers afresh perspective on the longstanding debate
over the insurability of punitive damages. Prepared for the Sympo-
sium, Calabresi's The Costs of Accidents: A Generation of Im-
pact on Law and Scholarship, the Article takes as its starting point
Calabresi's insight that the line separating insurable "costs" from
noninsurable "penalties" should be grounded upon the distinction
between accidental and intentional misconduct. The Article asks:
Should punitive damages be insurable in a Calabresian world? In
order to answer this question, the Article chronicles the insurability
debate itself, from its origins in the 1 960s up to the present. Close
study of the divergent legislative, judicial, and insurance industry
approaches reveals two competing insurance coverage dividing lines:
one separates compensatory and punitive damages, relying heavily
upon public policy considerations as set forth by legislatures and
courts; the second forges a line between accidental and intentional
conduct, resting primarily upon moral hazard economic principles
followed by insurance companies.
The Article argues that the traditional contours of the public
policy-driven debate, which focuses on the nature of the damages-
i.e., compensatory or punitive-should give way to the market-driven
intentionality line, which focuses on the nature of the underlying
conduct. A switch to the Calabresian/insurance industry line re-
spects the changing and expanding multifaceted roles of punitive
damages. Since the insurability debate arose in the 1960s in the
context of drunken driving cases, punitive damages have entered the
more complex realms of products liability, mass torts, employment dis-
crimination, and other civil rights violations-disputes that impli-
cate common-law and statutory punitive damages serving a range of
not only penal, but also remedial or compensatory purposes.
* Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I am especially grateful to my
colleagues Vince Blasi, Jack Coffee, Katherine Franke, Victor Goldberg, Sam Issacharoff,
Henry Monaghan, Susan Sturm, and John Witt for helpful discussions and comments on
previous drafts. Thanks also to Robert Ahdieh, Tom Baker, Ina Bort, Richard Ericson,
Noah Feldman, Mark Geistfeld, John Goldberg, Ariel Porat, Gil Seinfeld, Jennifer Wrig-
gins, and Ben Zipursky for comments; to fellow Symposium panelists Mike Rustad and
Tony Sebok for lively discussion; and to Jonathan Peck and Scott Rader for excellent re-
search assistance. It is a great honor to contribute to a Symposium celebrating the work of
Guido Calabresi, whose wisdom guided me as his student and judicial law clerk and contin-
ues to inspire me today.
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Finally, the Article acknowledges the difficulties posed by the ac-
cidental-intentional line drawing, as exemplified in drunken driving
cases, and identifies statutory multiple damages as a future chal-
lenge for the insurability debate.
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INTRODUCTION
Thirty-five years ago, with the publication of The Costs of Accidents,1
Guido Calabresi called for a transformative reconceptualization of ac-
cident law. He sketched the outlines of a new theoretical foundation
and provided a critical appraisal of the existing fault system's inability
to achieve what he identified as the two primary tort goals: accident
cost reduction and justice. In an early review of The Costs of Accidents,
Frank Michelman confessed to being filled with "despair" by the task
of attempting to distill Calabresi's "amazing concoction of cragginess
and grace, of homely example and mindcracking neologism, of lucid-
1. GuIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTs: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970) [hereinafter THE COSTS OF AcCIDENTS].
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ity and abstrusity, of steadfast focus and spiraling digression. '"2 More
than a quarter-century later, with the added weight of accumulated
influence over generations of scholars and practitioners, engaging
Calabresi's Costs still inspires awe, reverence, and (not insignificant)
trepidation.
In the category of "mindcracking neologism,"3 Calabresi sug-
gested that any system of accident law must decide "what-is-a-cost-of-
what" and "what-is-the-cost."4 By the former, Calabresi meant "[t]he
question of which acts or activities 'cause' which accident costs,"
whereas the latter question involved "what value to give to accident
costs."5 "What-is-a-cost-of-what" (which Michelman termed "the liabil-
ity question"6 ) has received the lion's share of academic attention and
commentary.7 Here, however, I would like to focus on the remedial
end: the assessment of damages, and in particular, what are termed
"punitive" damages. In one sense, this simply entails a shift in empha-
sis to Calabresi's second neologism, "what-is-the-cost" (which
Michelman termed "the cost-valuation question"'). But in a deeper
sense, it calls for a shift in the traditional approach to tort theory and
doctrine, from its virtually exclusive emphasis upon the liability side of
the equation to a more sustained focus upon remedies.
Calabresi's key insight was that there was no necessary link be-
tween compensating victims and deterring or punishing injurers.9
Challenging the traditional "bilateral" or "bipolar" view of torts, Cala-
bresi imagined a system whereby our treatment of injurers and wrong-
2. Frank I. Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's
Costs, 80 YALE L.J. 647, 648 (1971) (book review). Calabresi has praised Michelman's re-
view as "[t]he most scholarly, and hence the best, review" of his book. Guido Calabresi,
Remarks: The Simple Virtues of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2201, 2203 (1997). Moreover,
Calabresi credits Michelman's extension of his analysis into the field of nuisance law as
having provided "inspiration" for his own seminal article (with Douglas Melamed), Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089
(1972). Calabresi, supra, at 2203.
3. Michelman, supra note 2, at 648. I have it on good authority that Professor
Michelman used "neologism" in its primary meaning of "a new word, usage, or expres-
sion," as opposed to its secondary meaning as "a meaningless word coined by a psychotic."
MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 778 (10th ed. 1996).
4. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 198.
5. Id.
6. Michelman, supra note 2, at 654 n.15.
7. E.g., Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703 (1996); Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Correlated Values
in the Theory of Property and Liability Rules, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 121 (2003); Richard R.W.
Brooks, The Relative Burden of Determining Property Rules and Liability Rules: Broken Elevators in
The Cathedral, 97 Nw. U. L. Rmv. 267 (2002).
8. Michelman, supra note 2, at 654 n.15.
9. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 22-23, 297.
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doers might be decoupled from our treatment of their direct
victims.1 And he held up the widespread availability of insurance as
evidence of movement in this direction in the realm of automobile
accidents.11
How far does this insurance rationale carry us? Put differently, in
a Calabresian world, should all "costs" or damages be insurable? What
about punitive damages in particular? It may come as something of a
surprise to learn that The Costs of Accidents contains not a single refer-
ence to punitive damages. This is perhaps indicative of a predomi-
nant view of "costs of accidents" as questions of liability first, and of
remedy more as afterthought. Notwithstanding its relative neglect of
remedies, however, Calabresi's Costs provides a key-and until now
overlooked-insight that is relevant to the ongoing debate over the
insurability of punitive damages.
While Calabresi did not mention punitive damages by name, he
did discuss some continuing reluctance to insure willful misconduct
because of its negative impact upon deterring wrongdoing.' 2 Cala-
bresi suggested that such resistance to insurance could be overcome,
and adequate deterrence achieved, by the imposition of noninsurable
tort fines and penalties upon intentional misconduct.'" Calabresi
drew the line between insurable "costs" and noninsurable "penalties"
grounded upon a distinction between accidental and intentional mis-
conduct.14 Interestingly, in practice, insurance companies likewise
tend to draw the coverage line at intentionality. We might say that the
insurance industry, in line with Calabresi's view, is ultimately more
concerned with the nature of the conduct of the wrongdoer, as op-
posed to the nature of the damages awarded.
If the Calabresian/insurance industry line were heeded, several
implications follow for the debate regarding the insurability of puni-
tive damages, which "continues to plague the courts, insurers and in-
sureds.""5 First, the contours of debate grounded in public policy-
based distinctions between insurance coverage of punitive as opposed
to compensatory damages-remarkably similar today to its 1960s ori-
gins-are misguided. Second, a switch in focus to the accidental-
intentional conduct divide not only defers to market-driven insurance
10. Id. at 239-41.
11. Id. at 47-50, 240-41.
12. Id. at 305.
13. I& at 269, 305.
14. Id. at 269-71, 305.
15. 1 JOHNJ. KIRCHER & CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACrICE
§ 7:10, at 7-36 (2d ed. 2000).
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industry practice, but also is consistent with the modern expansion of
punitive damages. Since the origins of the insurability debate in the
1960s in the context of drunken driving accidents, punitive damages
have entered the more complex realms of products liability, mass
torts, employment discrimination, and other civil rights violations-
disputes that implicate common-law and statutory punitive damages
serving a range of not only penal, but also remedial or compensatory
purposes. Third, the switch from emphasis upon the nature or classi-
fication of damages to the intentional nature of underlying conduct
brings with it its own new set of difficulties, which must be confronted.
I will explore these issues in turn, following a brief review of Cala-
bresi's discussion of insurance and misconduct in The Costs of Accidents.
Part I summarizes Calabresi's conception of a tort system character-
ized by widespread general insurance combined with a narrow set of
noninsurable fines and penalties. Part II expands the scope of inquiry
to the debate over the insurability of punitive damages. I argue that
the traditional contours of the public policy-driven debate, which fo-
cuses upon the nature of the damages-i.e., compensatory or puni-
tive-should give way to the market-driven intentionality line, which
focuses on the nature of the underlying conduct. Insurance compa-
nies, as private regulators, are well positioned to achieve deterrence
through experience rating of firms and other actors, as well as by pro-
viding risk management services. Part III questions the tenuous link
at present between insurability and the role of punitive damages, and
it argues that the accidental-intentional divide would respect the
changing and expanding multifaceted roles of punitive damages. Fi-
nally, I conclude with acknowledgement of difficulties posed by the
accidental-intentional line drawing in the context of drunken driving
cases-challenges themselves unwittingly presaged in Calabresi's
Costs.
1 6
I. INSURANCE AND MISCONDUCT IN CALABRESI'S COSTS
Calabresi's ideas about deterrence, penalties, and insurance
should be examined in the wider context of the debate over the insur-
ability of punitive damages-a debate that emerged roughly contem-
poraneously with The Costs of Accidents, and continues to present day.
From our vantage point today, when punitive damages have emerged
as a controversial, prominent feature of tort doctrine and practice
(and, more gradually, theory), we are better poised to assess the inter-
play between the changing role of punitive damages and the ongoing
16. I use the adverb "unwittingly" here with Judge Calabresi's blessing.
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insurability debate. We are also afforded a unique lens through which
to examine Calabresi's early ideas.
A. Insurance as Rejection of the "Bilateral" View of Accidents
Calabresi's Costs ushered in a sustained era of criticism of the
traditional "bilateral" (or "bipolar") view of. torts, defined as "the no-
tion that justice require [s] a one-to-one relationship between the
party that injures and the party that is injured." 7 Calabresi's basic
insight-that "[t] here is, of course, no logical necessity for linking our
treatment of victims, individually or as a group, to our treatment of
injurers, individually or as a group"18-has spawned seminal work by
law and economics scholars, who have experimented in various ways
with "decoupling" the law's treatment of plaintiffs and defendants in-
volved in the same lawsuit. 19
Calabresi discusses two alternative notions of individualized treat-
ment. The first is a conception of "victims' rights": "that the victim-
or his family-has the right to see that retribution is exacted."2 ° Cala-
bresi disparages this notion, which "smacks more of revenge than of
deterrence or compensation."2' Calabresi accords more respect to a
second alternative notion of individualized treatment that "holds that
the injurer should pay damages according to the degree to which he
wronged the victim."2 2 He further describes this view as the idea that,
as between parties involved in an accident, "it is better that the loss be
17. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 297.
18. Id.; see Jules L. Coleman, The Costs of The Costs of Accidents, 64 MD. L. REv. 337,
343 (2005) ("[Calabresi's] great innovation ... was to present the problem of tort law not
as one between particular actors, but as a social problem: the problem of accidents.").
19. E.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for
Care and Litigation, 22 RAND J. ECON. 562 (1991); David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence
and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REv. 1871
(2002). Many of these more complicated models might be seen as extensions of Cala-
bresi's basic intuition that the key question in our society is "how much all injurers should
pay, in relation to their individual wrongdoing, into a fund to compensate all victims, in
relation to their injuries and their wrongdoing." THE COSTS OF AcCIDENTs, supra note 1, at
302.
20. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 298.
21. Id. The victims' rights notion, moreover, is, according to Calabresi, "analogous to
the ancient right of the homicide victim's family to indict the alleged murderer crimi-
nally." Id. It is also reminiscent of the French practice of combining the victim's civil suit
for damages with the criminal trial. SeeJOHN H. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE: GERMANY 111-12 (1977); see also Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment
Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583,
635 (2003) (arguing in favor of a bilateral view of punitive damages, which should be
"thought of as an intellectual precursor to the modern victims' rights movement in the
criminal law").
22. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 299.
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borne by the one who has committed acts carrying moral stigma than
by the one who has not."23 While somewhat more sympathetic toward
this view, Calabresi nonetheless rejects it as "simplistic" in the context
of our "multilateral world with a whole population of injurers and
victims.
'
"24
Calabresi's rejection of the bilateral view of tort law spawned the
rise of the corrective justice theorists' defense, a defense that has been
sustained for over thirty years, and which continues to morph into
different varieties.25 I do not wish to revisit this "clash" between the
economically minded deterrence theorists and philosophically
minded corrective justice theorists. Instead, I want to focus upon Cal-
abresi's support for his notion that 'justice" (at least in its tort incarna-
tion) does not require that an individual injurer compensate his
individual victim.
Here, Calabresi rests heavily-as an empirical if not as a theoreti-
cal matter-upon the wide availability (and acceptance) of insurance.
As a general matter, Calabresi asserts that "the allowance of insurance
for faulty parties is clear indication that this notion [that justice does
not require that individual injurers compensate individual victims] is
accepted."26 Indeed, "the general acceptance of insurance strongly
suggests that we do not worry too much about whether the individual
faulty party pays his victim, so long as the victim is paid."27 Again,
corrective justice theorists have responses to Calabresi's insurance
23. Id.
24. Id. at 301.
25. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RIsKS AND WRONGS 209 (1992) ("I want to argue not
only that identifying and vindicating rightful claims to repair are legitimate aspirations of a
law of tort, but that the best explanation of current Anglo-American tort law sees the prac-
tice primarily in terms of its efforts to meet these demands ofjustice-what I call corrective
justice."); id. at xvi ("Many of the ideas developed here first came to my attention upon
reading [Calabresi's] The Costs of Accidents. There is every reason to believe, however, that
he continues to disagree with me at nearly every turn."); ERNESTJ. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF
PRIVATE LAW 63 (1995) ("Presenting corrective justice as a quantitative equality captures
the basic feature of private law: a particular plaintiff sues a particular defendant."); see also
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 707 (2003)
("What is essential to tort law's structure is that courts infer from a defendant's wrongful
injuring of a plaintiff that the defendant must compensate the plaintiff for the injury
imposed.").
26. THE COSTS OF AccIDENTS, supra note 1, at 302. Samuel Issacharoff and John Witt
provide a rich account of the role played by institutional actors in the tort system-from
translators to insurance claims adjusters to class action attorneys-in aggregating tort
claims from the very beginning of tort law to modern day. Samuel Issacharoff & John
Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort
Law, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1571 (2004).
27. THE COSTS OF AccIDENTS, supra note 1, at 304-05.
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challenge, but I will not rehearse these responses here.28 What is im-
portant for present purposes is to examine how far Calabresi is willing
to push his argument about the availability of insurance.
What then, on Calabresi's account, are the appropriate outer
bounds for insurance coverage? Somewhat cryptically, Calabresi as-
serts that "we do-with some misgivings-generally allow insurance
against liability for wanton and willful misconduct."29 The source of
"our misgivings" is further explained: "[W]e sometimes fear that
noninsurable fines proportionate to the wrongdoing and adequate to
achieve deterrence will not in fact be placed on wanton and willful
wrongdoers. If they were, we would not be troubled by the fact that
liability beyond such fines could be insured against."'
In other words, the apparent fear about insuring willful miscon-
duct is due to its negative impact upon deterrence of wrongdoing."'
Calabresi suggests that such resistance to insurance could be over-
come, and adequate deterrence achieved, by the imposition of nonin-
surable tort fines and penalties upon intentional (or wanton and
willful) misconduct.32 Calabresi thus draws a dividing line between
insurable "costs" and noninsurable "penalties" based upon a distinc-
tion between accidental and intentional misconduct. This raises the
question: To what extent might these noninsurable penalties be lik-
ened to punitive damages?
B. Noninsurable Tort Fines and Penalties
Although the words "punitive damages" are nowhere to be found
in The Costs of Accidents, Calabresi's discussion of tort fines and penal-
ties echoes (or really, foreshadows) two issues raised by their close
28. As Jules Coleman argues:
There is another way of looking at the relationship between insurance and tort
law .... According to this account, it is important to distinguish between insur-
ance as an institution that arises in order to enable individuals to discharge their
substantive duties under the law and insurance itself as a goal of the law, as capa-
ble of providing independent grounds for imposing substantive duties under the
law.
COLEMAN, supra note 25, at 206; see also id. at 207 ("Because insurance depends on the
existence of liability rules, it cannot provide a ground or reason for imposing liability in
one way rather than another.").
29. THE COSTS OF AccIDENTS, supra note 1, at 305.
30. Id
31. Id. Of course, separate and apart from deterrence-based concerns might be con-
cerns based upon retributive goals. But here I follow Calabresi in highlighting the deter-
rence-based objection as the main source of concern.
32. Id. at 268-70.
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analogue in the tort system. 3 First, there is the issue of choosing the
appropriate size and type of "penalty." Perhaps no single issue in pu-
nitive damages has captured the attention of scholars, policymakers,
and lawyers alike than the debate over the size of punitive damages,
and whether or not they are irrational and outrageously large or, al-
ternatively, fairly predictable and reasonably related to the size of
compensatory damages.3 4 What is often (albeit not invariably) over-
looked is the want of theory that would suggest that punitive damages
should, in fact, conform to some multiple of compensatory damages.
On this score, Calabresi mentions the possibility of making the tort
penalties greater "if serious harm results than if it does not," but only
if "the degree of preaccident wrongdoing can to some extent be
gauged by the seriousness of the resulting damages." 5
Second, Calabresi mentions the possibility that tort penalties
might vary with the income level of the wrongdoer.3 6 Here too, Cala-
bresi places his thumb on a heavily contested scale, that of gauging
the appropriate role for defendant's income or wealth in assessing pu-
nitive damages.3 7
33. Analogues might also be found in criminal or regulatory fines. Defending penal-
ties within the tort system (as opposed to the criminal or administrative systems) is beyond
the scope of this Article. But clearly the policy considerations with regard to insuring puni-
tive damages could change if criminal law imposes sanctions on the wrongdoer for the
same behavior. For an interesting perspective on mass torts that brings the law of attempt
to the tort system, see Richard A. Nagareda, Outrageous Fortune and the Ciminalization of
Mass Torts, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1121 (1998).
34. Compare, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Em-
pirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 743, 745 (2002) ("IJ]uries rarely award [punitive] dam-
ages, and award them especially rarely in products liability and medical malpractice
cases.... When juries do award punitive damages, they do so in ways that relate strongly to
compensatory awards." (footnotes omitted)), with, e.g., Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Puni-
tive Damages: How Judges andJuries Perform, 33J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2004) ("[The] tendency
of large punitive awards to be the result ofjury decisions is consistent with the experimen-
tal evidence as well as popular perceptions. Analysis of these very large awards indicates
that they bear no statistical relation to the compensatory awards.").
35. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 270 n.5. Calabresi concludes that "only
by the merest coincidence would the appropriate penalty be equal to the damages caused,
let alone to the increase in the injurer's insurance premiums resulting from his having had
an accident." Id.
36. Id. at 128 n.25, 270 n.5.
37. Compare, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Punitive Damages and the
Rule of Law: The Role of Defendant's Wealth, 18J. LEGAL STUD. 415, 415 (1989) ("[T]he defen-
dant's wealth is irrelevant to the goal of deterring socially undesirable conduct and is an
improper consideration in assessing the basis for retribution."), with, e.g., Jennifer H. Ar-
len, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 428-29 (1992) ("[T]o the
extent that punitive damage awards correct for underdeterrence resulting from the use of
purely compensatory damages, current law permitting juries to take defendants' wealth
into account . . . may be theoretically correct. . .. ." (footnote omitted)).
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Before we embrace the view that Calabresi's noninsurable tort
fines and penalties are tantamount to punitive damages (which by ex-
tension should be noninsurable), however, it is worth examining
more closely Calabresi's account on its own terms. According to Cala-
bresi, it is crucial, as a conceptual matter, to disentangle tort penalties
(or fines) from the "fault system.""8 While critical of the latter, Cala-
bresi wants to hold onto (or reinvent) the former. Calabresi's discus-
sion here is quite abstract and theoretical; nonetheless, he gives us
one concrete example which we will explore: drunken driving.
Drunken driving is, to Calabresi, the quintessential example of an
activity that is best deterred by a system of noninsurable penalties:
[W] henever we are dealing with activities that can be defined
independently of accidents, such as drunken driving, a sys-
tem of appropriate noninsurable penalties is more likely to
be an effective deterrent than the fault system, which allows a
substantial part of the penalty to be both shifted and prepaid
through insurance. 9
Calabresi explains further that "whenever normal individuals can
choose whether or not to engage in wrongful conduct before an acci-
dent, an appropriate noninsurable penalty is necessarily a more effec-
tive deterrent than an already paid insurance premium."4" Calabresi
also recognizes that the deterrent effect may go beyond the re-
straining effect on the individual wrongdoer: "If it can be assumed
that charging a penalty after an accident will in the future deter the
doer and others like him from other acts that would ex post be collec-
tively deemed undesirable, then it may not be irrational to have such
after-the-fact penalizations."4
Calabresi's requirement that the penalty be noninsurable is tied
specifically to the way the insurance market operates:
38. See THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 273 ("Once again, what we are consid-
ering is the fault-insurance system itself, not the noninsurable penalties that go along with
the system."); id. at 277 n.3 ("If we can use noninsurable penalties to supplement civil
liability based on fault, we can certainly use them to supplement civil liability based on
market control.").
39. Id. at 269.
40. Id. at 269-70. Noninsurable penalties deter more effectively "than insurable fault
payments, in which the only financial deterrent that can be effective at the time of the
choice between doing or not doing a wrongful act is the possibility of higher premiums in
the future-a possibility that exists even when an accident is not due to a wrongful act by
the insured." Id. at 270 (footnote omitted); see infra note 115 and accompanying text (not-
ing disagreement over whether the possibility of increased premiums has a deterrent
effect).
41. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 123.
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The aim of penalizing conduct defined after the accident is
to influence behavior . . . immediately before any accident.
The notion behind such ex post allocations of fines has to be
that individuals can at the last minute before an accident es-
timate what would be penalized better than insurance com-
panies can when, long before the accident, they make up
actuarial groups and set rates for them.4 2
Although not fully fleshed out, I believe what Calabresi has in mind
here is the notion of moral hazard, or the ability of an individual to
affect the likelihood that a particular probabilistic occurrence materi-
alizes-an issue to which we will return when we consider insurance
industry practice in the next Part.4" For the moment, it is worth em-
phasizing that Calabresi draws the line between insurable costs and
noninsurable penalties based upon the distinction between accidental
and intentional misconduct.
We will now explore the way in which the insurability debate has
played out on somewhat different terms in the legislatures and the
courts. As we shall see, the insurance industry's embrace of the
Calabresian accidental-intentional conduct line suggests a reframing
of the insurability debate that not only would promote clarity and effi-
ciency, but is also consistent with the modern evolution of punitive
damages doctrine and practice.
II. INSURABILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Punitive damages, although around for centuries, may seem a dis-
tinctively modern preoccupation. The debate over the insurability of
punitive damages did not begin until the 1960s. At that time, notwith-
standing the well-entrenched existence of punitive damages in Ameri-
can common law, "[s]trangely enough, there [was] only a slight
sprinkling of cases on the question of the insurer's liability for puni-
42. Id. at 126. This assumes that insurance companies cannot reduce risks ex ante.
Imagine instead, for example, that insurance companies could provide a discounted rate
for cars that have breathalyzer systems that prevent driving by persons with alcohol on their
breath. For discussion of insurance companies' provision of such "risk management ser-
vices," see infra notes 144-146 and accompanying text.
43. Calabresi concedes that "[w]hile the reason for this may seem obvious, the analysis
is actually rather complex, and the problem deserves separate attention." THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 125. George Priest answered this call in his article, Insurability
and Punitive Damages, in which he presents a lucid application of the modern understand-
ing of the economics of insurance to the issue of the insurability of punitive damages.
George L. Priest, Insurability and Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REv. 1009, 1033-35 (1989); see
infra notes 127-132 and accompanying text.
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tive damages."44 In his treatise Damages to Persons and Property (1961),
Howard Oleck wrote that "[i] t would seem that insurance against ex-
emplary damages frustrates their purposes and should be considered
contrary to public policy."45
As a historical note, up until about 1830, a similar view prevailed
among courts and treatise writers regarding insurance for injuries
caused by negligence.4" Oleck's statement is remarkably similar to
that of Willard Phillips, who wrote ih his Treatise on the Law of Insurance
(1823) that insurance against losses voluntarily incurred
seems to be so obviously opposed to the general interest of a
community, that it could hardly be enforced by any legal tri-
bunal. And there is the same objection, in a smaller degree,
against sustaining a contract to indemnify a man against the
consequences of his own negligence. By such an agreement
one man would consent to put himself wholly in the power
of another, and it could operate only to the injury of the
parties, and of the community of which they were
members.47
As Kenneth Abraham documents, it was not until "the dawn of the
twentieth century [that] the courts were rejecting the concern that
liability insurance would so undermine safety incentives that this new
form of insurance was against public policy."48
The insurability issue has two main components: contract inter-
pretation and public policy. Courts generally employ a two-step analy-
sis. First, courts look to the language of the policy, using standard
44. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 436 (5th Cir. 1962). In Mc-
Nulty, the court went on to note that "[i] n most of these cases the court has held there was
coverage, without discussing what to us seems more important-the question of public
policy." Id. The lack of attention devoted to the insurability issue may be due in part to
the fact that, in most cases, the sums of money at stake were relatively small.
45. HOWARD L. OLECK, DAMAGES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY § 275C, at 560.6 (rev. ed.
1961).
46. E.g., MORTONJ. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
202 (1977). Horwitz notes that "[ajfter 1830.. .judicial opinion abruptly shifted to allow
individuals to insure against losses arising from their own negligence." Id. This doctrinal
shift was reflected by Chancellor Kent, who wrote in his revised Commentaries (1832),
"whether the negligence and frauds which the insurance of property from fire has led to,
did not counterbalance all the advantages ... the public judgment in England, and in this
country, has long since decided the question with perfect satisfaction." Id. (quoting 3
JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 370 (2d ed. 1832)). Nonetheless, "it was
quite some time before legal writers could fully rationalize this new doctrine." Id
47. Id. (quoting WILLARD PHILLIPS, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 158 (1823)).
48. Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability Insurance and Accident Prevention: The Evolution of an
Idea, 64 MD. L. REv. 573, 584 (2005).
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contract interpretation tools.4 9 If the policy appears to cover punitive
damages on its face or as interpreted, the next step is to determine
whether insuring punitive damages is contrary to public policy in that
state.50 The typical "standard-form" liability insurance contract pro-
vides that the insurance company will pay "all sums" the policyholder
is obligated to pay as "damages" due to bodily injury or property dam-
age arising from an incident covered by the policy.
51 The contract
interpretation approach to the insurability question relies upon the
language of the contract, coupled often with the principle that any
ambiguities in language should be read against the drafter of the con-
tract (in most cases the insurance company).52 In some states, the
contract interpretation approach is determinative.
5 3
The vast majority of courts, however, give some heed to public
policy considerations, which predominate in the resolution of the in-
surability issue. Public policy is defined loosely to mean the public
good.54 Courts and legislatures holding that insurance coverage for
punitive damages violates public policy generally do so on the theory
that insurance would undermine the socially beneficial goals of pun-
ishment and deterrence. 55 Those taking the opposite position, sus-
taining the insurability of punitive damages, dispute the diminished
deterrence theory.5 6
49. See, e.g., Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 567 P.2d 1013, 1014-15 (Or. 1977) (exam-
ining the language of the policy in question and noting that "the primary rule of contract
interpretation, including insurance contracts, is to ascertain the intent of the parties").
50. Id. at 1015. Several courts have reversed this process, given that, logically, a deter-
mination that public policy prohibits insurance coverage for punitive damages would
render moot any analysis of the specific contract terms. See, e.g., Mazza v. Med. Mut. Ins.
Co., 319 S.E.2d 217, 220-23 (N.C. 1984) (considering public policy arguments first, then
parsing the language of the policy).
51. See, e.g., Harrel; 567 P.2d at 1014.
52. Mazza, 319 S.E.2d at 222-23; Harrelg 576 P.2d at 1015; Lazenby v. Universal Under-
writers Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tenn. 1964). In a similar vein, courts have also inter-
preted policies in part based upon what an average policyholder would expect to be
covered. Mazza, 319 S.E.2d at 222-23; Harrel4 576 P.2d at 1015; Lazenby, 383 S.W.2d at 5.
53. See, e.g., Greenwood Cemetery, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 232 S.E.2d 910, 913-14
(Ga. 1977) (finding that "all sums" language in an insurance policy covers directly assessed
punitive damages and thus refusing to deny coverage on public policy grounds); Carroway
v. Johnson, 139 S.E.2d 908, 910 (S.C. 1965) (holding that an insurer was required to pay
punitive damages under broad "all sums" language of an automobile insurance policy).
54. Lazenby, 383 S.W.2d at 5 ("Public policy is the present concept of public welfare or
general good. Public policy is practically synonymous with public good ... " (citation
omitted)).
55. See infra Part II.A.2.a ("Insurance Prohibited").
56. See infra Part II.A.2.b ("Insurance Allowed").
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So the question naturally arises: Should punitive damages be in-
surable in a Calabresian world?57 In order to answer this question, itis useful to chronicle the insurability debate itself, from its origins in
the 1960s up to the present. In particular, close study of the divergent
legislative, judicial, and insurance industry approaches reveals two
competing insurance coverage dividing lines: one separates compen-
satory and punitive damages, relying heavily upon public policy con-
siderations as set forth by legislatures and courts; the second forges a
line between accidental and intentional conduct, resting primarily
upon moral hazard economic principles followed by insurance
companies.
Several insights follow from the fact that the insurance market
apparently draws a line different from that drawn by traditional tort
doctrine and, for that matter, state practice. While traditional tort
doctrine places significance upon the characterization of damages as
compensatory or punitive, the insurance market segments claims
along an accidental-intentional dichotomy that cuts across the catego-
ries of compensatory and punitive damages. We might say that the
insurance company is ultimately more concerned with the nature of
the conduct of the wrongdoer, as opposed to the nature of the damages
awarded. In sum, it appears that the insurance market has already
answered the insurability question along Calabresian lines.
A. Compensatory vs. Punitive Damages: A Public Policy-Based Divide
The two leading cases in the punitive damages insurability debate
arose in the early 1960s in the automobile accident context, address-
ing the plight of intoxicated drivers. They staked out opposing posi-
tions: Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty railed against
insurance for punitive damages, which it likened to criminal penalties,
on public policy grounds;58 Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Insurance
Co., in contrast, championed the pro-insurance position, disparaging
the deterrence-based policy arguments of McNulty.59
McNulty and Lazenby continue to define the terms of the modem
insurability debate. Of the forty-five states that permit common-law
punitive damages,6" thirty-four states have conclusively resolved the in-
57. It bears repeating that Calabresi is primarily concerned with deterrence-based ob-jections to insurability, as opposed to those based upon theories of retribution. See supra
note 31 and accompanying text.
58. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
59. 383 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1964).
60. Nebraska does not allow punitive damages in any circumstance, either by commonlaw or statute. Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 443 N.W.2d 566, 574-75 (Neb.
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surability issue, either by statute or by a ruling of the highest state
court: nine have adopted the McNulty position and twenty-five appar-
ently side with Lazenby.6
1. The Emerging Debate at the Time of The Costs of Accidents.-
The two judicial opinions just mentioned emerged in the early 1960s,
and, as I said, they would define the warring positions for decades to
follow. They deserve to be examined in some detail.
McNulty, a prominent Fifth Circuit opinion written by Judge Wis-
dom, is the progenitor of the anti-insurance position. In that case,
Walter Smith, a drunken driver, lost control of his vehicle and hit Ed-
ward McNulty's car from behind.62 Smith fled the scene, and was ar-
rested several miles away when his car ran out of gas.
63 McNulty
suffered serious injuries, including permanent brain damage.64 The
jury returned a verdict for McNulty, awarding him $37,500 in compen-
satory damages and $20,000 in punitive damages.65 McNulty (joined
by Smith) brought a successful action to recover on Smith's $50,000
liability insurance policy.66 The insurance company appealed on the
ground that the punitive damages portion was not recoverable either
under the terms of the contract or as a matter of public policy.
67
Judge Wisdom was influenced by the "fact that death and injury
by automobile is a problem far from solved by traffic regulations and
criminal prosecutions."6" He went on to conclude that "there are es-
pecially strong public policy reasons for not allowing socially irrespon-
sible automobile drivers to escape the element of personal
punishment in punitive damages when they are guilty of reckless
1989). Punitive (or exemplary) damages are allowed in Louisiana, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and Washington only if expressly authorized by statute. Crane v. Diamond
Offshore Drilling, Inc., 743 So. 2d 780, 796 (La. Ct. App. 1999); Int'l Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson,
443 N.E.2d 1308, 1317 n.20 (Mass. 1983); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (1997); Stanard v.
Bolin, 565 P.2d 94, 98 (Wash. 1977).
61. See infra note 92 (listing the states that prohibit insurance for punitive damages);
infra notes 93-94 (listing the states that have determined that punitive damages are insura-
ble); see also Appendix, infta (categorizing all 50 states and the District of Columbia by
insurability status and listing relevant statutory and case law authority).
62. McNulty, 307 F.2d at 433.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. The policy was standard form, in which the insurer was responsible "[
t] 
o pay on
behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages because of... 'bodily injury'... [or] injury to or destruction of property." Id. The
court decided the case on public policy grounds, and therefore found it unnecessary to
construe the contract. Id. at 434.
68. Id. at 441.
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slaughter or maiming on the highway."69 Judge Wisdom made two
main arguments in support of this view, starting from the premise that
the purposes of punitive damages are to punish and to deter.7"
First, Judge Wisdom reasoned that allowing the wrongdoer to
shift his burden to an insurance company would undermine the pun-
ishment goal: "Where a person is able to insure himself against pun-
ishment he gains a freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the
establishment of sanctions against such misconduct." 71 By contrast,
personal payment of the award ensures that the wrongdoer suffers
punishment.72 Judge Wisdom invoked an analogy to criminal law:
Just as it is against public policy to enable an individual to insure him-
self against criminal liability, it is equally repugnant to allow him to
purchase insurance against punitive damages.73 Moreover, "there is
no point in punishing the insurance company; it has done no
wrong." 74
Second, Judge Wisdom emphasized the incompatibility of puni-
tive damages insurance with the deterrence goal. He argued that aninsured tortfeasor, immunized from the burden of punitive liability
for his wrongdoing, could not be held up as an example to deter the
general public. 75 And he was convinced that
[i] t is no answer to say, society imposes criminal sanctions to
deter wrongdoers .... [For while] [a] criminal conviction
and payment of a fine to the state may be atonement to soci-
ety for the offender[,] . . . it may not have a sufficient effect
69. Id.
70. Id at 434-36. The court looked to the substantive law of punitive damages of both
Florida (where the accident occurred) and Virginia (where the insurance policy was is-
sued). Id. The court concluded that, in each state, punitive damages are awarded for the
dual purposes of punishment and deterrence. Id. at 434-35 & n.5.
71. Id. at 440. As a general matter, according to Wisdom, "[i]f [a] person were permit-
ted to shift the burden to an insurance company, punitive damages would serve no useful
purpose." Id.
72. Consider the analogy in the corporate context, where "[t]he classic reason offered
for using the criminal law when financially equivalent civil remedies are available has been
that the criminal law uniquely can focus public censure upon the guilty defendant." John
C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem ofCorporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386, 447 (1981). Coffee, by contrast, is primarilyfocused on deterrence. He cautions that "[t]he study of corporate criminal responsibility
too long has been led astray by commentators seeking to fashion retributive justifications."
Id. at 448.
73. McNulty, 307 F.2d at 440 ("It is not disputed that insurance against criminal fines orpenalties would be void as violative of public policy. The same public policy should invali-date any contract of insurance against the civil punishment that punitive damages
represent.").
74. Id.
75. Id.
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on the conduct of others to make the public policy in favor
of punitive damages useful and effective.76
Moreover, according to Judge Wisdom, common industry prac-
tice would further diminish the deterrence goal. Insurers required to
indemnify their clients for adverse punitive damages judgments would
simply pass that significant cost on to the general public through
higher premiums." Society as a whole, then, would bear the burden
for the wrong committed by the individual policyholder, and the indi-
vidual's motivation to refrain from such wrongful conduct would be
weakened.78 To ensure instead that punitive damages adequately ful-
fill their deterrence objective, Judge Wisdom stressed that "the delin-
quent driver must not be allowed to receive a windfall at the expense
of purchasers of insurance, transferring his responsibility for punitive
damages to the very people-the driving public-to whom he is a
menace."79 As we shall see, the basic structure ofJudge Wisdom's two-
part attack on insurability has withstood the test of time. It remains to
this day the bulwark of the anti-insurance position.8 °
Two years after McNulty, the Tennessee Supreme Court decided
Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., the first and still leading
challenge to McNulty.8" Lazenby, too, involved a drunken driver, Nor-
man Frank Crutchfield, who injured a minor, Frances Jean Lazenby,
in an automobile accident.82 Lazenby was awarded $4,000 in dam-
ages, of which $1,087 was punitive damages.83 Crutchfield's insurance
company refused to pay the punitive damages portion of the judg-
ment.84 The trial court found against the insurance company.
85 On
76. Id. at 44142.
77. Id. at 440-41.
78. Id. According to Judge Wisdom, "considering the extent to which the public is
insured, the burden would ultimately come to rest not on the insurance companies but on
the public, since the added liability to the insurance companies would be passed along to
the premium payers." Id. Ironically, "[s]ociety would then be punishing itself for the
wrong committed by the insured." Id. at 441.
This argument parallels one of the arguments for municipal immunity from punitive
damages. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 263 (1981) ("In general,
courts viewed punitive damages [assessed against municipalities] as contrary to sound pub-
lic policy, because such awards would burden the very taxpayers and citizens for whose
benefit the wrongdoer was being chastised."); Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236,
239-40 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi,J.) (elaborating upon the Newport rationale that imposing
punitive damages upon municipalities would burden "innocent taxpayers").
79. McNulty, 307 F.2d at 442.
80. It likewise remains sharply contested by the pro-insurance position, which chal-
lenges the link between deterrence and noninsurability. See infra Part II.A.2.b.
81. 383 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1964).
82. Id. at 2.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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appeal, the insurance company urged the Tennessee Supreme Court
to adopt the McNulty court's position. 6
Notwithstanding the fact that, in Tennessee, punitive damages
are awarded in order to punish willful misconduct and to deter others
by providing an example or warning-in other words, the same "dom-
inant purpose for the allowance of punitive damages" considered in
McNulty---the court reached the opposite result on public policy
grounds.8 7 First, the court was highly skeptical of the McNulty deter-
rence rationale: "We ... are not able to agree [that] the closing of the
insurance market, on the payment of punitive damages . . .would
necessarily accomplish the result of deterring [socially irresponsible
drivers] in their wrongful conduct."88 Second, the court relied upon
the fact that the standard-form language of the insurance policy had
been construed by previous courts to cover both compensatory and
punitive damages.8" Accordingly, "the average policy holder reading
this language would expect to be protected against all claims, not in-
tentionally inflicted.""° Third, the court maintained that "[tihere is
often a fine line between simple negligence and negligence upon
which an award for punitive damages can be made."'"
McNulty and Lazenby defined the emerging judicial debate on the
insurability of punitive damages in the context of drunken driving ac-
cidents-a prevailing preoccupation of tort lawyers and scholars of
the time. Moreover, even as the paradigmatic automobile accident
has retreated in the face of the expansion of tort liability into products
liability, civil rights violations, employment disputes, and mass harms,
McNulty and Lazenby have continued to focus the terms of the debate.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2-3.
87. Id. at 5.
88. Id. In the words of a concurringJustice: "It would be pure speculation to conclude
that by denying coverage that accidents on the highways would decrease or that operators
of automobiles would be any more careful in their driving habits or the care with which
they operate them." Id. at 8 (White, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 5.
90. Id. Once again, the insurance policy at issue was the typical standard form, requir-ing the company to pay "all sums" the insured is "obligated to pay as damages" for injuries
.caused by [automobile] accident." Id. at 2 (quoting the insurance policy). Indeed, the
court ultimately concluded that freedom of contract should prevail over public policy con-
cerns. Id. at 5.
91. Id. In the words of a concurring Justice, whereas the McNulty jury awarded both
compensatory and punitive damages (and the court held the latter uninsurable), "on iden-
tical facts, another jury might have returned an award limited to compensatory damages
only in which case the wrongdoer would be fully protected under provisions of a policy
such as here." Id. at 7 (White, J., concurring).
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2. The Continuing Debate in Our Time.-McNulty and Lazenby still
represent the respective positions in the insurability debate. Although
McNulty must concede its minority position status, insurance for puni-
tive damages is still prohibited on public policy grounds in several
states. Nine states have conclusively determined (by statute or deci-
sion of the highest state court) that insuring punitive damages would
contravene public policy.92 Lazenby commands the clear majority.
The insurability of punitive damages has been assured, by state legisla-
tive proviso or decision of the highest state court, in twenty-five states.
Four states-Hawaii, Montana, Nevada, and Virginia-permit that
coverage by statute.9" In the remaining states, insurability has been
upheld either strictly as a matter of contract interpretation, as a mat-
ter of public policy, or both.
9 4
a. Insurance Prohibited.-McNulty has served as the basis for
other states' adoption of public policy proscriptions against insuring
punitive damages. In fact, almost all of the subsequent courts that
92. These states include California, Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Minnesota, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, and Utah. Utah has enacted a comprehensive bar to any coverage of
punitive damages. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-20-101 (2001) ("No insurer may insure or at-
tempt to insure against ... punitive damages."). Ohio has enacted a somewhat more lim-
ited statutory prohibition. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.182 (Anderson 2002)
(proscribing insurance coverage for punitive damages as part of any policy of motor vehi-
cle insurance or any policy of casualty or liability insurance, including fidelity, surety, and
guaranty bonds). The statutory prohibition has, nonetheless, been interpreted rather
broadly by the Ohio courts. See, e.g., Casey v. Calhoun, 531 N.E.2d 1348, 1350-51 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1987) (refusing to allow an insurance company to indemnify an individual, pursuant
to a personal injury liability policy, for punitive damages awarded in a slander case). In the
remaining states, the highest state court has spoken on the matter. See Appendix, infra.
Moreover, the public policy prohibition position has been espoused by lower state
courts and/or federal courts (sitting in diversity) in Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, NewJersey,
and Pennsylvania. See id.
93. Virginia's statute expressly declares that no public policy prohibition exists against
insuring punitive damages. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-227 (Michie 2002). Nevada's statute
does not reference public policy, but allows an insurer to "insure against legal liability for
exemplary or punitive damages that do not arise from a wrongful act of the insured com-
mitted with an intent to cause injury to another." NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. 681A.095 (Michie
2003).
By contrast, Hawaii and Montana prohibit construction of an insurance policy to pro-
vide coverage for punitive damages unless specifically included in the policy. H-Aw. REv. STAT.
§ 431:10-240 (2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-15-317(1) (2003).
94. These states include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware,
Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ore-
gon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See
Appendix, infra. Washington, which only allows punitive damages authorized by statute, see
supra note 60, otherwise belongs in this group as well. See Appendix, infra. States in which
lower state courts or federal courts have taken the pro-insurance position include Michi-
gan and Texas. See id.
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have found punitive damages uninsurable on public policy grounds
have relied to a substantial degree upon Judge Wisdom's analysis.95 In
sum, "public policy prohibits insurers from assuming any obligation
for indemnity of punitive damages. Otherwise, the legal and social
purposes for punitive damages would be defeated."96 Punitive dam-
ages continue to be analogized to criminal fines.97 Their "dominant"
purposes-punishment and deterrence-are stressed as inconsistent
with an insurability norm.9" Moreover, "[c]ommon sense demands
that the burden of satisfying a punitive-damage award should remain
with the wrongdoer and should not be cast upon the blameless shoul-
ders of the other insureds."99 Refuting the more modern "consumer
expectations" argument (as more jurisdictions have adopted the pro-insurance position), these states hold firm to their belief that "a per-
son has no right to expect the law to allow him to place responsibility
for his reckless and wanton acts on someone else."1' 0
In a sweeping generalization, the California Supreme Court has
proclaimed that the justification for the public policy prohibition "ap-
plies whatever the basis for the punitive damages award.""1 1  The
breadth of this public policy prohibition is not, alas, without carve-
outs, as indicated by the pervasiveness of the vicarious liability
exception.
Most of the states that prohibit insurance for punitive damages
on public policy grounds nonetheless permit that insurance when pu-
nitive damages are vicariously (as opposed to directly) assessed against
95. See, e.g., Beaver v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 420 N.E.2d 1058, 1060-61 (Ill. App. Ct.1981) (adopting McNulty's rationales as "the better view"); Esmond v. Liscio, 224 A.2d 793,799-800 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1966) (reviewing decisions of other jurisdictions and adopting the
McNulty rationale for precluding insurability of punitive damages).
96. Lira v. Shelter Ins. Co., 903 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994), affd, 913 P.2d
514 (Colo. 1996).
97. See, e.g., Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) ("If a person is able toinsure himself against punishment, he gains a freedom inconsistent with the establishing
of sanctions against such misconduct. It is undisputed that insurance against criminal fines
would be void as violative of public policy."); see also Koch v. Merchs. Mut. Bonding Co.,507 P.2d 189, 196 (Kan. 1973) ("The objective to be attained in imposing punitive dam-
ages is to make the culprit feel the pecuniary punch, not his guiltless guarantor."); Wojciak
v. N. Package Corp., 310 N.W.2d 675, 680 (Minn. 1981) ("[W]e are satisfied that in mostinstances public policy should prohibit a person from insuring himself against misconduct
of a character serious enough to warrant punitive damages.").
98. United States Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bould, 437 So. 2d 1061, 1064 (Fla. 1983) ("TheFlorida policy of allowing punitive damages to punish and deter those guilty of aggravated
misconduct would be frustrated if such damages were covered by liability insurance.").
99. Allen v. Simmons, 533 A.2d 541, 544 (R.I. 1987) (holding punitive damages unin-
surable in the automobile context).
100. Nicholson v. Am. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).101. Peterson v. Superior Court, 642 P.2d 1305, 1311 (Cal. 1982) (emphasis added).
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a defendant.10 2 Vicarious liability results when the policyholder is
held liable for another person's actions, solely on the basis of a partic-
ular relationship between the two parties, such as employer and em-
ployee. 10 3 Once again, McNulty led the pack with the rationale that "if
the employer did not participate in the wrong the policy of preventing
the wrongdoer from escaping the penalties for his wrong is inapplica-
ble."'0 4 In other words, the dual purposes of punishment and deter-
rence lose their force when the party whose liability is vicarious has
not acted in any "blameworthy" manner. 105
George Priest has remarked that the rationale for the exception
allowing insurance coverage when vicarious liability is implicated "is
not well worked out."' °6 In particular (and setting to one side the
retribution-based concern with culpability or blameworthiness),
"[c]ourts have not explained why there should be less concern over
diminishing the deterrent effect of vicarious liability."10 7 At least one
NewJersey court seems to take the view, in fact, that there is no defen-
sible rationale on deterrence grounds. In Johnson &Johnson v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., a New Jersey court held that a corporation can-
not indemnify itself for punitive damages in a products liability case,
102. The vicarious liability exception is recognized in some form in California, Florida,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania. Kansas is the
only state to have codified this exception. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2, 115 (2001). The re-
maining states recognize a common-law exception. See Appendix, infra. NewJersey appar-
ently prohibits insurance of punitive damages in vicarious liability situations. SeeJohnson
&Johnson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 667 A.2d 1087 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); infra
notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
103. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1962).
104. Id. at 440; see also United States Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bould, 437 So. 2d 1061, 1064
(Fla. 1983) ("[P]ublic policy is not violated by construing a liability policy to include puni-
tive damages recovered by an injured person where the insured did not participate in or
authorize the act." (quoting Sterling Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 187 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1966))).
Hence, the critical debate becomes whether an entity may be held directly liable for
injuries caused by its agents. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
420 F. Supp. 92, 96-97 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (distinguishing the situation where a corporation
itself is found to have acted "maliciously or oppressively" from that where "the corporation,
without itself being guilty of willful misconduct, is held to respond in damages for the
intentional tort of its agent").
105. The same arguments raised against insuring punitive damages are applicable to the
question of whether the law should impose vicarious liability for punitive damages. In
many respects, the effects of vicarious liability are similar to those of insurance. For this
reason, some states reject altogether the imposition of punitive damages in vicarious liabil-
ity situations. See, e.g., Dalton v.Johnson, 129 S.E.2d 647, 651 (Va. 1963) ("[S]ince exem-
plary or punitive damages are awarded not by way of compensation to the sufferer but by
way of punishment to the offender, such damages can only be awarded against the one
who has participated in the offense.").
106. Priest, supra note 43, at 1009.
107. Id.
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regardless of whether the corporation is held directly or vicariously
liable.1 °8 According to the court:
Punitive damages "serve the public interest by encouraging
corporations to keep defective products ... out of the mar-
ketplace." Permitting a shift of responsibility for punitive
damages from the manufacturer to its insurance company in
a product liability case would thwart those purposes.10 9
The court emphasized that it was necessary to "punish 'the corpora-
tion itself,' and to deter the corporation and others from engaging in
similar conduct in the future."11 In this regard, a vicarious liability
exception would "frustrate those goals."'111
b. Insurance Allowed.-If the jurisdictions were evenly di-
vided on the insurability issue in the 1960s and 197 0s, the legislative
and judicial trend in the past several decades has been squarely in the
direction of expanded insurability. As George Priest has noted, "[t]he
current trend toward allowing punitive coverage builds on modern
skepticism of any deterrent effect of punitives at all or of any indepen-
dent deterrent effect."'1 2 In the words of the Oregon Supreme Court:
It has long been recognized that there is no empirical evi-
dence that contracts of insurance to protect against liability
for negligent [or reckless] conduct are invalid, as a matter of
public policy, because of any "evil tendency" to make negli-
gent conduct "more probable" or because there is any "sub-
stantial relationship" between the fact of insurance and such
negligent conduct .... Conversely, neither is there any such
evidence that to invalidate insurance contract provisions to
protect against liability for punitive damages on grounds of
public policy would have any substantial "tendency" to make
such conduct "less probable," i.e., that to do so would have
any "deterrent effect" whatever upon such conduct.'13
108. 667 A.2d 1087, 1092 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995). In two underlying products
liability cases, juries awarded $517,500 and $2.75 million in punitive damages against de-
fendants Johnson & Johnson and its subsidiary Ortho, respectively. Id. at 1088-89. The
corporations then filed a declaratory judgment action against their insurer, seeking indem-
nification for the awards. Id. at 1089.
109. Id. at 1092 (citation omitted).
110. Id. (citation omitted).
111. Id.
112. Priest, supra note 43, at 1031.
113. Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 567 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Or. 1977). The Oregon Su-
preme Court criticized the McNulty decision and its policy arguments with impunity, label-
ing its reasoning "fallacious." Id. at 1020. Indeed, the court could have cited the
nineteenth-century critique of insurance for injury caused by negligence. See supra note 47
and accompanying text (noting the nineteenth-century disfavor of liability insurance).
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The Wyoming Supreme Court expressed this skepticism a decade
later:
We know of no studies, statistics or proofs which indicate
that contracts of insurance to protect against liability for pu-
nitive damages have a tendency to make willful or wanton
misconduct more probable, nor do we know of any substan-
tial relationship between the insurance coverage and such
misconduct. 14
Other courts have been convinced that the provision of insurance
does not alter the deterrent effects of punitive damages, either be-
cause insurers can raise premiums after awards, or else insurers can
build the expected cost of punitives ex ante into their premiums.
11 5
As for the argument that allowing such coverage would shift the bur-
den onto the public, courts have responded that this overlooks the
fact that, by charging an additional premium, insurance companies
can collect a separate fund for the express purpose of paying such
judgments.1 16 In other words, "an insurance company which deliber-
ately enters into a contract to provide coverage against liability for
punitive damages is free to charge either a separate or additional pre-
mium for that risk."'
1 7
114. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 682 P.2d 975, 981 (Wyo. 1984); see also
Skyline Harvestore Sys., Inc. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 331 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Iowa 1983)
("[W]e doubt that ordinary potential tortfeasors make calculations to determine if the
expected benefits of a harmful act are outweighed by the potential costs of punitive dam-
ages, insured or uninsured.").
115. E.g., Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 502 P.2d 522, 524 (Ariz. 1972) (rea-
soning that even with liability insurance a tortfeasor would still be subjected to considera-
ble automobile insurance premiums, as well as facing possible criminal actions and loss of
license); First Nat'l Bank v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 389 A.2d 359, 366 (Md. 1978) ("[T]hose
who are demonstrated by experience to be poor risks encounter substantial difficulty in
obtaining insurance, a fact such persons know."); see also LEE R. Russ, COUCH ON INSUR-
ANCE § 101:29, at 101-99 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that the deterrence argument "underesti-
mates the impact that a large payment by an insurer would have on the insured's ability to
obtain future insurance coverage, and the amount of premiums that would have to be
paid").
Incidentally, Calabresi rejected this rationale on two grounds. First, he argued that
"the manner in which insurance rates change as a result of accidents clearly is so haphaz-
ard and arbitrary under the fault system that the possibility of rate increases cannot con-
ceivably be as good a collective deterrent as an intelligently fixed noninsurable fine." THE
COSTS OF ACCIDENrs, supra note 1, at 271 n.6. Second, he noted that "even this risk of
going into a higher risk actuarial subcategory by reason of accident involvement could
conceivably be insured against." Id. at 125 n.23.
116. Price, 502 P.2d at 524 (reasoning that "since [the insurance company's] premiums
were based on its exposure, it may be presumed that holding it liable for what it has prom-
ised to pay would not result in additional burdens on the driving public").
117. Harrell, 567 P.2d at 1019. This rationale also stems from underlying support for the
principles of freedom of contract. See id. at 1016 ("It is elementary that public policy re-
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B. Accidental vs. Intentional Conduct: A Market-Based Divide
The public policy-based approach to the insurability question,
consistent with traditional tort doctrine, would treat compensatory
damages as separate and distinct from punitive damages. However, a
line drawn on the basis of intentionality of conduct would cut across
these damages categories. The intentional act exclusion-which ex-
cludes from coverage acts "intended" or "expected" by the insured-
thus presents a rather striking alternative to the public policy-based
compensatory versus punitive damages approach. The intentional act
exclusion might be described as a competing "market-based" ap-
proach, save for the fact that it is often enshrined as part of state law,
indeed on public policy grounds that resonate with those explored
above in Part II.A. But the state law approach is in some intellectual
disarray; namely, the very same public policy deterrence rationale that
had been used to justify the blanket proscription on insuring punitive
damages is now put forth in defense of the narrower intentional act
exclusion. In light of the public policy approach's failure to establish
a clear-cut distinction (and hence acknowledging its manipulability),
it is worth exploring whether insurance industry custom and practice
might yield a more satisfactory approach. In the Sections that follow,
I explore in turn the intentional act exclusions employed by our pub-
lic and private insurance regulators.
1. State Law.-Although a majority of the states have concluded
that punitive damages are insurable, most explicitly except intentional
misconduct."l 8 As the Alabama Supreme Court has explained,
"[t]here can be no valid insurance coverage which will protect or in-
demnify the insured or indemnitee against a loss which he may pur-
posely and willfully create, or which may arise from his immoral,
quires that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of
contracting, and that their contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be
held sacred and shall be enforced by courts ofj ustice .... " (quoting Eldridge v. Johnston,
245 P.2d 239, 251 (Or. 1952))). Many courts have held that, except in compelling cases,
public policy should not be used to override contracts between private parties. E.g., DeVet-
ter v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 516 N.W.2d 792, 794-95 (Iowa 1994); First Nat'l Bank, 389
A.2d at 364.
118. These states include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. See
Appendix, infra. Two additional states have statutory intentional act exclusions: California
(where it has been read consistent with the public policy prohibition against insuring puni-
tive damages), and North Dakota (where, at least in a limited context, the policy of free-
dom of contract has trumped statutory policy considerations, in favor of insuring punitive
damages). See id.
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fraudulent, or felonious conduct."' 9 The Iowa Supreme Court re-
cently agreed, explaining that "[b]arring coverage in these circum-
stances discourages insureds from intentionally harming others, as
intentional wrongdoers cannot then rely on the availability of insur-
ance to shield them from the civil consequences of their miscon-
duct."120  The Virginia and Nevada legislatures have codified this
distinction, allowing insurance for punitive damages, but not inten-
tional acts.121 Virginia's provision proclaims: "It is not against the
public policy of the Commonwealth for any person to purchase insur-
ance providing coverage for punitive damages arising out of the death
or injury of any person as the result of negligence, including willful
and wanton negligence, but excluding intentional acts."122
In theory, these states draw a different exclusionary line, circum-
scribing intentional acts only (whether resulting in compensatory
1 23
or punitive damages), as opposed to punitive damages more gener-
119. Fid.-Phenix Fire Ins. v. Murphy, 146 So. 387, 390 (Ala. 1933); see also Cont'l Ins. Co.
v. McDaniel, 772 P.2d 6, 8 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) ("[O]nce one intentionally commits an act
against another and injury results as a natural and probable consequence of the inten-
tional act, the injury is intended and expected and therefore excluded from coverage.").
An interesting parallel exists in federal securities law. A public policy-based prohibi-
tion-derived from insurance law-restricts a corporation from indemnifying its directors
and officers for securities law violations predicated upon their intentional or reckless con-
duct. See Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969) ("It is well
established that one cannot insure himself against his own reckless, wilful or criminal mis-
conduct."). While courts' application of this principle of insurance law has been inconsis-
tent, most courts that have disallowed indemnification for intentional, reckless, or criminal
acts on the ground of public policy have focused on the deterrent effect of the statute
violated by those seeking indemnification. See, e.g., id. ("Civil liability under [the Securities
Act] ... was designed not so much to compensate the defrauded purchaser as to promote
enforcement of the Act and to deter negligence by providing a penalty for those who fail in
their duties.").
120. Grinell Mut. Reins. Co. v.Jungling, 654 N.W.2d 530, 538 (Iowa 2002). These states
nonetheless have deferred to competing interests-such as malicious prosecution claims
against the state, e.g., Titan Indem. Co. v. Riley, 679 So. 2d 701, 705-07 (Ala. 1996); discrim-
ination claims against the state, e.g., Harris v. County of Racine, 512 F. Supp. 1273, 1280-82
(E.D. Wis. 1981); or compensating the innocent victims of the misconduct, e.g., Jungling,
654 N.W.2d at 541-when they acquiesce to the provision of insurance for intentional
conduct.
121. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-227; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 681A.095.
122. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-227.
123. Although, as indicated above, supra note 120, courts may be likely to depart from
strict enforcement of the public policy exclusion of intentional acts where compensatory
damages are at stake and a victim might otherwise go uncompensated. See also St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co. v. Jacobson, 826 F. Supp. 155, 164-65 (E.D. Va. 1993) (recognizing an
exception to Virginia's public policy against insurance coverage for intentional acts where
an infertility specialist fraudulently inseminated patients with his own semen, and noting
that "countervailing considerations, i.e., compensating [defendant's] innocent victims, de-
cidedly outweigh the concern that [defendant] will unjustly benefit from the extension of
coverage").
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ally. But the rationales put forth by courts hardly validate any clear-
cut distinction. A line of Texas decisions provides an apt illustration.
Texas is ajurisdiction in which at least the lower courts have rejected a
general public policy proscription against insuring punitive damages,
in part on the now widely shared view that " [i] t is doubtful whether
the denial of insurance coverage for liability against punitive damages
actually deters culpable actors. 4 Nonetheless, the very same deter-
rence rationale is put forth to justify the narrower intentional act ex-
clusion recognized in Texas law: "The rationale behind the
[intentional act exclusion] is that the insured is more likely to engage
in behavior which is harmful to society if he believes that he will not
have to bear the financial costs of his intentional indiscretions. ''125
2. Insurance Industry Practice.-Perhaps, then, it would prove
more fruitful to look to insurance industry custom and practice for a
more satisfactory rationale of the intentional act exclusion. Insurance
policies typically contain exclusions for "expected" or "intended"
acts. 
12 6
George Priest has provided a rich account of the basic economic
underpinnings of insurance law and practice. Simply stated, two re-
lated conditions must be met in order for a risk to be insurable. First,
the losses must be probabilistic: "A loss that is certain to occur in some
particular period cannot be insured against; one can only accumulate
savings before the loss occurs or after the loss is suffered to restore the
previous economic position.' 1 27 Second, the ever-present problem of
Indeed, it is not uncommon in the realm of medical malpractice insurance for courts
to determine, in line with a strong interest in compensating innocent victims, that the
allegedly intentional acts of medical professionals are covered. E.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Asbury, 720 P.2d 540, 542 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Kambly, 319
N.W.2d 382, 384-85 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
124. Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Safiway Steel Prods. Co., 743 S.W.2d 693, 704 (Tex.
App. 1987). For a more detailed discussion of Texas' line of cases, see infra notes 192-200
and accompanying text.
125. Decorative Ctr. v. Employers Cas. Co., 833 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex. App. 1992).
126. The typical provision excludes coverage for bodily injury and property damage that
is "expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured." Tom Baker, Reconsidering
Insurance for Punitive Damages, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 101, 119 (quoting I SUSAN J. MILLER &
PHILLIP LEFEBVRE, MILLER'S STANDARD INSURANCE POLICIES ANNOTATED 409 (1996)). An
analogous exclusion in automobile liability insurance contracts provides that injury or
damage must be "caused" by accident. See, e.g., Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty,
307 F.2d 432, 433 (5th Cir. 1962) (quoting a standard-form automobile insurance policy
that excluded coverage for "bodily injury or property damage caused intentionally by or at
the direction of the insured").
127. Priest, supra note 43, at 1020. The insured loss may be probabilistic "either as to
whether the losses will occur at all (for example, whether a product will prove defective) or
as to when losses certain to occur actually will occur (for example, whether one will die
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moral hazard must be restrained.' 28 Moral hazard describes the be-
havioral effects of insurance on the insured; thereby, if insurance low-
ers expected injury costs, the insured will proceed with risky activities,
increasing the likelihood of injuries to others.1 29 To guard against
this, "[i]nsurers will constrain or, at the limit, exclude coverage of
losses particularly susceptible to insured moral hazard," i.e., occur-
rences "intended" or "expected" by the insured.13 ° The insured, who
now faces the prospect of paying for such losses himself, will exercise
greater care to avoid the risk altogether.' This is especially impor-
tant in situations where the insured's actions significantly affect the
probability that losses will materialize. In this way, coverage exclu-
sions are an effective means of controlling the threat to deterrence
posed by moral hazard.11
2
Expanding upon Priest's insight, Tom Baker has argued that "in-
surance companies have a strong financial incentive to construct the
insurance relationship in a manner that answers the theoretical objec-
tions to insurance for punitive damages.'13 3 Moreover, "insurance
companies [tend to] underwrite and draft insurance contracts in ways
that appear to be consistent with that incentive."134
Insurance companies typically include intentional act exclusions
as well as exclusions for "fines" and "penalties. '1 35 Why then do they
before or after full life expectancy)." Id. In other words, there can be interpersonal loss
spreading, as well as intertemporal loss spreading.
128. Id. at 1023-24. To limit risks and thus make insurance widely available by reducing
its costs, insurers must be able to "narrow the assortment of risks within a risk pool." Id. at
1022. In Priest's view, "[a] court that wanted to maximize insurance availability in the
society would adopt policies that encouraged maximally effective discrimination in order
to segregate risks into the narrowest possible pools." Id. at 1023. Priest notes that Cala-
bresi instead emphasized the role of spreading losses in The Costs of Accidents. Id. & nn.53,
54.
129. See Richard A. Epstein, Imperfect Liability Regimes: Individual and Corporate Issues, 53
S.C. L. REv. 1153, 1158 (2002) ("The purchase of insurance creates a dilemma that is easy
to state but impossible to solve: the insured defendant may be more likely to engage in
activities that cause harm precisely because he is aware that someone else will be there to
foot the bill for defense costs and liability once the losses happen.").
130. Priest, supra note 43, at 1024. Priest notes that "the exclusion serves to control
moral hazard by removing the incentive that providing large monetary amounts to benefi-
ciaries would add to other forces compelling the act." Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Baker, supra note 126, at 126.
134. Id. Baker also states that "[b]ecause of intentional harm exclusions, the liability
insurance that is actually provided through the insurance market poses much less an insur-
ance-deterrence tradeoff than the simple model of insurance that is employed in most
economic theory." Id. at 103.
135. E.g., Carey v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 189 F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 1998); supra note
126.
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not simply add explicit exclusions for punitive damages? 136 After all,
they have been on notice, at least since McNulty, that they should warn
their insureds of their intention to deny coverage on punitive dam-
ages claims.137 Moreover, courts have increasingly weighed the ab-
sence of any punitive damages exclusion as a strong factor in favor of
concluding that punitive damages fall within the policy's coverage.13 8
Priest confronted this punitive damages exclusion puzzle.1 39 Ac-
cording to Priest, the "basic principles of insurance provide an an-
swer"; namely, "[t] he reluctance of insurers to amend basic policies to
more precisely exclude coverage of punitive liability reflects respon-
siveness to consumer demand for liability insurance." 4 ° A related ex-
136. See Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Tenn. 1964)
(White,J., concurring) ("[I]f the insurance industry feels that punitive damages protection
should not be afforded under automobile liability policies, it can very easily make a provi-
sion in the exclusions section to that effect.").
Punitive damages exclusions can take a variety of forms, including language either
expressly excluding punitive damages or else expressly including only compensatory dam-
ages. See, e.g., DeShong v. Mid-States Adjustment, Inc., 876 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)(interpreting language in a policy that stated that the insurer would pay amounts it was
"legally required to pay to compensate others" as excluding punitive damages). According
to Tom Baker, punitive damages exclusions are rare, although they are slightly more likely
to appear in umbrella and excess liability insurance policies. Baker, supra note 126, at 119,
122. On top of intentional harm exclusions and punitive damages exclusions, insurance
companies might also include claim-specific exclusions, such as for asbestos, sexual harass-
ment, assault, or pollution claims. Id at 122. Claim-specific exclusions, which are added
for a variety of reasons, have the ancillary effect of excluding from coverage claims that
might commonly result in unpredictably large punitive damages judgments. Id.
137. See Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 443 (5th Cir. 1962) ("The
Court is shocked that this insurer failed to put the insured on notice of its intention to
deny liability for punitive damages."); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 389
A.2d 359, 367 (Md. 1978) (noting that insurance companies have been on notice since
Lazenby that they might be held responsible for paying punitive damages claims).
138. Creech v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 516 So. 2d 1168, 1172 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (noting
that the insurer "could have changed the policy language . . . [and] provided for [the]
exclusion"); Mazza v. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 319 S.E.2d 217, 223 (N.C. 1984) ("We place great
emphasis on the fact that there is no specific exclusion in the insurance contract for puni-
tive damages."); Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 567 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Or. 1977) ("[A]
Court should not aid an insurer which failed to exclude liability for punitive damages."(quoting 7J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAc-ricE § 4312, at 86 (Supp. 1972))); see also
Baker v. Armstrong, 744 P.2d 170, 174 (N.M. 1987) ("If insurance companies market poli-
cies which consumers reasonably expect cover all damages, then the insurer should honor
that contract.").
139. Priest, supra note 43, at 1033 ("The puzzle remains, however, why insurers have not
modified policies to exclude coverage of punitive liability despite invitations to do so by the
courts.").
140. Id.; see also Baker, supra note 126, at 122 ("[E]fforts to include [punitive damages]
exclusions in the industry-wide standard form primary policies have been rejected on mar-
keting grounds.").
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planation might be the soft (highly competitive) insurance market, at
least throughout the 1990s."'
One significant effect of the expanding and changing nature of
punitive damages (which I will explore in Part III)-whereby punitive
damages have expanded into realms such as products liability and em-
ployment disputes, and are increasingly assessed for grossly negligent
or reckless conduct, as opposed to fraud, oppression, or malice-is
that risks of losses leading to punitive damages awards have become
more probabilistic and less subject to insured moral hazard. 142
As a result, there is not only greater consumer demand for such
coverage, but it also makes economic sense for insurers to offer such
coverage.143 From the insurer's perspective, it does not matter
whether damages (or expected losses) are legally described as com-
pensatory or punitive. What is key is not only the insurer's assessment
of the risks for a class of losses, but also its ability to control costs.
Victor Goldberg highlights the importance of the ability of insurance
companies to control risks ex ante; in essence, they sell "risk manage-
141. This was the predominant reason given independently by two insurance profession-
als-a lawyer and a broker with more than fifty years' combined experience in the indus-
try-whom I interviewed confidentially. Telephone Interviews with Anonymous Lawyer
and Insurance Broker (June 16, 2004) [hereinafter Telephone Interviews]. Additional rea-
sons included "ignorance" on the part of the consumer market and brokers and possible
resistance by state insurance regulators. Id. For example, in 1977, Insurance Services Of-
fice, Inc. (ISO)-an organization that provides standardized insurance policy forms for use
by insurers-filed, on behalf of its member insurers, a punitive damages exclusion for lia-
bility coverage in personal and commercial lines of insurance. In 1978, in light of con-
cerns expressed by insurers as well as state regulators, ISO withdrew its filing. Telephone
Interview with LaurenceJ. Skelly, ISO Senior Counsel (Dec. 2, 2004). In response to this
type of concern, North Carolina provides statutory authorization for insurance companies
to exclude coverage for punitive damages. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-41-50 (1998) ("With
respect to liability insurance policy forms, an insurer may exclude or limit coverage for
punitive damages awarded against its insured.").
142. In a related vein, Jennifer Wriggins has made the case for expanding liability insur-
ance even further, to cover domestic violence torts:
Liability insurance . . . is not limited to coverage for harms that are produced
unintentionally.... Insurance has developed over the last decade for employers
covering their liability for employees' intentional acts such as sexual harassment.
As new forms of liability emerge, insurance often follows. Despite early chal-
lenges in pricing employers' liability insurance, this insurance has become widely
available. It should also be possible to determine prices for the insurance pro-
posed here [for domestic violence torts].
Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 121, 156 (2001) (footnotes
omitted).
143. In other words, it becomes more feasible for the pricing of general liability insur-
ance to anticipate paying a certain amount of punitive damages. This general understand-
ing was echoed by the insurance broker with whom I spoke. Telephone Interviews, supra
note 141.
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ment services including inspection, litigation, and administration of
compensation."
14 4
A particularly salient modern example exists in the market for
terrorism insurance. Here, as Richard Ericson and Aaron Doyle em-
phasize, "[i]nsurers play key but often hidden roles in establishing
preventive security and loss prevention infrastructures, whether based
on environmental design, electronic surveillance technologies, or pri-
vate security operatives. 1 45  Insurance coverage may thus serve not
only to spread losses, but to reduce them as well. 146
Simultaneously, however, a certain amount of ambiguity sur-
rounding punitive damages coverage may suit insurers, who are able
to remain competitive by satisfying consumer demand for such cover-
age, and still reserve the right, after the fact, to disclaim liability for
144. VICTOR GOLDBERG, FRAMING CoN-rRAcT LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, Ch. 1.1
(forthcoming 2005). Goldberg elaborates:
For example, for steam boiler and elevator insurance, inspection costs account
for over twenty percent of the insurance premium. If insurance companies are
more efficient at providing these services, other firms would pay them to do so,
regardless of attitudes toward risk.
Id. Indeed, as Kenneth Abraham points out, "[a]s early as the turn of the century.... the
Travelers Insurance Company was inspecting the premises of its policyholders and giving
them reductions in premiums for complying with safety standards." Abraham, supra note
48, at 590.
The modern role of insurers in risk management varies enormously by insurance line,
market conditions, and the like. See RI-CHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE
267-310 (2003) (discussing myriad ways in which insurers mobilize the insured in loss pre-
vention activities).
145. Richard V. Ericson & Aaron Doyle, Catastrophic Risk, Insurance and Terrorism, 33
ECON. & Soc'v 135, 139 (2004); see id. at 154 ("Insureds in need of terrorism coverage
could be compelled to 'target harden' their persons and property by hiring more security
personnel, buying more electronic surveillance technologies, and opening up to audits of
their employees, operations, security infrastructure, and so on."). Indeed, according to
Ericson and Doyle, "[t]he New York City Comptroller reported that, in 2001, over 1 per-
cent of all workers in New York City were security guards"-a result largely driven by tight-
ened insurance requirements. Id. at 164.
Susan Sturm is less optimistic about the risk management role served by insurers in
the employment context. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 458, 549 (2001) ("Unless encouraged to do so by
authoritative public actors, the insurance industry also faces serious obstacles to moving
beyond a narrow, reactive definition of risk management in their interactions with employ-
ers about equity concerns.").
146. Priest, supra note 43, at 1021-24. Priest likewise emphasized the dual roles played
by insurance in terms of risk spreading and risk reduction, but did not consider insurance
companies' superior ability to control risks ex ante. See id. at 1021 ("[T]o the extent the
losses and accompanying risks are truly independent, their aggregation not only spreads
them, diminishing the impact of a loss on an individual insured, it also reduces the total
risk level of the pool below the preaggregated sum of individual risks.").
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punitive damages.' 47 With cover from the public policy exclusion, in-
surance companies can thus have their cake and eat it, too. 148 In-
deed, some state legislatures have intervened (no doubt as a result of
insurance company efforts) to provide that such coverage will not be
presumed absent an express inclusion of coverage by the insurance
companies. 14  Absent such legislative direction, however, courts in-
creasingly refuse to exclude coverage where not specified in the insur-
ance contract.15 0
147. Insurance companies have attempted to argue that punitive damages, which are
akin to "private fines" or "civil penalties," should not be included under the rubric of
"damages" as contemplated in insurance contracts. See, e.g., Collins & Aikman Corp. v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 436 S.E.2d 243, 246 (N.C. 1993).
148. In a similar vein, Tom Baker has commented:
Insurance companies largely have chosen to limit punitive damages coverage in-
directly, rather than by explicitly excluding coverage for punitive damages. Not-
withstanding the freedom of contract ideology that still animates much of
insurance practice, liability insurance companies regularly refuse to pay punitive
damages claims on the grounds that public policy forbids it.
Baker, supra note 126, at 123-24 (footnote omitted). Baker explores a few possible expla-
nations for the insurance industry's approach, including the existence of a kind of "prison-
ers' dilemma," whereby "even though offering [punitive damages] insurance may be in the
best interests of the industry as a whole .. . the contrary interests in the individual situa-
tions overwhelm that collective interest." Id. at 125.
149. HAw. REV. STAT. § 431:10-240; MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-15-317(1); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Takeda, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1109 (D. Haw. 2003) (granting partial summaryjudgment
in favor of the insurer because the policy did not specifically provide for coverage for
punitive damages).
Punitive damages inclusions can take a variety of forms. A recent development
(within the past ten years) is the inclusion of "most favorable venue" language, a kind of
"choice-of-law" provision that specifies, for example, that if an issue arises regarding puni-
tive damages, the carrier will apply the law and public policy of an applicable state with the
.most favorable" view of insurance coverage for punitive damages. Telephone Interviews,
supra note 141. The insurance professionals with whom I spoke reiterated that the exis-
tence of punitive damages inclusions were a sign of sophistication on the part of underwrit-
ers and insurance brokers, and bespoke a heightened awareness on the part of insurance
buyers of various states' public policy exclusions and the like. Id.
A more sensible approach, given potential asymmetries of information between con-
sumers and insurance companies, might be a statutory provision that presumed coverage
absent express exclusion, and thus worked akin to an information-forcing penalty default.
See infra note 212 and accompanying text (outlining this approach).
150. See supra note 138 (noting cases where courts have cited the absence of an express
exclusion as grounds for holding that punitive damages are covered). The insurance pro-
fessionals with whom I have spoken confirmed that-the majority of policies in the United
States are silent with respect to punitive damages. Telephone Interviews, supra note 141. It
would be interesting to know, as an empirical matter, how frequently punitive damages
exclusions are employed, and whether their use has increased in recent years along with
the growth and expansion of the punitive damages doctrine. It would also be interesting
to track whether an increasing number of off-shore policies-specifically guaranteeing that
punitive damages would be paid in jurisdictions where there is either a state legal or public
policy prohibition against such coverage-are sought.
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III. THE LINK BETWEEN INSURABILITY AND THE ROLE OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Perhaps insurance companies are onto something in focusing on
the insured's moral hazard risk as opposed to the nature of damages.
So we must ask: What difference does it make to draw the line of in-
surability at intentional conduct, as opposed to punitive damages?
Other scholars-primarily Priest and Baker-have recognized the di-
vergence between tort doctrine and insurance industry practice with
respect to the insurability debate. What has yet to receive sufficient
attention is the link between the insurability question and the chang-
ing and evolving roles assumed by punitive damages.
As the grounds for punitive damages expand, it would make
sense that insurance would follow suit, for two reasons. First, as the
risk of punitive damages increases in an ever-widening array of cases,
insurance for punitive damages makes economic sense for insurance
companies, which are attuned to probabilities and moral hazard con-
cerns. Second, as punitive damages are more frequently awarded
outside of the confines of malicious conduct, the force of public pol-
icy prohibitions based upon criminal penalty analogues diminishes.
A. Industry Practice vs. Tort Doctrine
What is one to make of the divergence between tort doctrine and
insurance industry practice on the question of the insurability of puni-
tive damages? George Priest read that disconnect as evidence that
something is awry in the nature of punitive damages, namely, the
modern expansion of punitive liability. According to Priest, "insur-
ance principles . . . demonstrate the very close relationship between
the economic grounds for excluding punitive coverage and the moral
grounds for awarding punitive damages in the first instance."'151 Priest
posited "an inverse relationship between feasible insurance of puni-
tives and the moral or instrumental justification for punitive
awards,"152 such that as punitive liability insurance expands, "the spe-
cial moral force of punitive liability [necessarily] disappears."' 53
Tom Baker has taken a different tack. For him, insurance com-
pany practice-primarily drafting contracts with intentional act exclu-
sions and other carve-outs (discussed above in Part II)-confirms that
"punitive damages insurance does not pose all the problems suggested
in the theoretical discussion, nor is prohibiting such insurance the
151. Priest, supra note 43, at 1011.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1034.
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panacea that a purely theoretical or doctrinal approach might sug-
gest."'154 Baker concluded that "from both a prevention and retribu-
tion perspective, it makes little practical difference whether punitive
damages are insurable or not.
1 55
In its modem incarnation, however, the debate over the insura-
bility of punitive damages highlights important issues that are neither
lamentable nor irrelevant on theoretical or practical grounds. First,
while historically it might have been true that punitive damages al-
igned rather comfortably on the "intentional harm" side of the divide,
that is not the case in modem tort law.' 56 Nor may this modem ex-
pansion be explained away simply in terms of the disappearance of
"the special moral force of punitive liability." 157
Second, it is no longer tenable for courts and state legislatures to
make sweeping public policy declarations regarding insuring punitive
damages without unpacking further, and in a more nuanced fashion,
the underlying roles and purposes of punitive damages. The public
policy component of the insurability issue implicates the central goals
or purposes of punitive damages within our tort system. With respect
154. Baker, supra note 126, at 126.
155. Id. at 129. Baker makes clear "that this does not mean, of course, that it might not
make a great difference to individual parties in individual cases." Id. And, in a separate
article, Baker explores various practical consequences of a public policy against insurance
for punitive damages, including increasing nominally "compensatory" payments at the set-
tlement stage. See Tom Baker, Transforming Punishment into Compensation: In the Shadow of
Punitive Damages, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 211, 214 (relying on interviews with personal injury
lawyers practicing in Florida-a jurisdiction that prohibits insurance for punitive damages
on public policy grounds).
Here, I want to emphasize the likely effect of increasing the amount of compensatory
settlements. For example, if a defendant anticipated a trial outcome of a compensatory
verdict of $500,000 and a punitive damages award of $2 million, it should rationally prefer
to settle for $1.5 million in compensatory damages, all of which would be insured. The
plaintiff, moreover, has no reason to resist this characterization. The same phenomenon is
at work in some other areas where insurance is barred by law. For example, in the securi-
ties law context, where directors' and officers' insurance covers violations of the duty of
care, but not violations of the duty of loyalty, parties have an incentive to settle all claims as
"duty of care" violations. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Ac-
tions, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 669, 716 n.128 (1986).
156. Priest and Baker both appreciate this development; Priest sees it as cause for alarm,
whereas Baker is seemingly agnostic. See Priest, supra note 43, at 1011 ("To the extent that
the expansion of punitive damages awards in modem times increases the feasibility of in-
suring punitive liability, it diminishes the underlying moral justification for punitive dam-
ages."); Baker, supra note 126, at 121 ("The relationship between the punitive damages
fault line and the intentional harm fault line is not straightforward. Not all cases of inten-
tional harm will meet the applicable tort law standard for punitive damages, nor will all
punitive damages cases meet the applicable insurance law standard for intentional harm."
(footnote omitted)).
157. Priest, supra note 43, at 1034.
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to states that have adopted a prohibition on insurance for punitive
damages, most have seemingly adopted McNulty's bottom line with
scant consideration of the nuances of the underlying reasoning re-
garding the character and function of punitive damages. 158 And as to
states that have allowed such insurance, there is just as frequently no
direct correspondence between the policy rationales governing insur-
ability and the underlying purposes of punitive damages. 159
Third, the insurability debate is certainly not moot, or of slight
practical significance. For more than four decades, insurance compa-
nies have been on notice of their potential liability for punitive dam-
ages in some states, and their corresponding ability to include
punitive damages exclusions, akin to the typical intentional act exclu-
sions. Nonetheless, the debate continues to resurface, albeit in
slightly different guises. What I hope to demonstrate next is that this
recurring debate-which promises to continue, if for no other reason
than that the issue has yet to be conclusively determined in thirteen
states I 60-pushes us in our understanding of the multifaceted roles of
punitive damages.
B. Expanding Roles of Punitive Damages
What was true at the time of McNulty--namely a "general lack of
agreement on the meaning of the term 'punitive damages' "16 1-has
only become more pronounced in the ensuing decades. Over the
years, the concept of punitive damages has evolved and expanded,
spawning an ongoing debate over the changing goals and purposes of
the doctrine, as it has been applied in new types of cases and contexts.
158. See supra notes 92, 95-101 and accompanying text (citing cases that have followed
McNulty and examining the justifications advanced in those cases).
159. See supra notes 93-94, 113-117 and accompanying text (examining cases that have
held that punitive damages are insurable and that insuring punitive damages is not viola-
tive of public policy).
160. States where the battleground is unsettled-i.e., not yet decided conclusively by
either the legislature or else the highest state court-include Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, as well as Washington, D.C. See Appendix, infra. The
Texas Supreme Court was on the verge of deciding the issue as this Article went to press.
See infra note 192.
161. 307 F.2d 432, 442 (5th Cir. 1962). In a concurring opinion, Judge Gewin went
even further, asserting that the term "punitive damages" is "a chameleon of the law-
changing its hue to the color of the situation in which it may be used." Id. at 443 (Gewin,
J., concurring). Judge Gewin also stated that "[t]he term is too loose, vague, indefinite and
uncertain; and its meaning often varies from state to state, court to court, and jury to jury."
Id. (Gewin, J., concurring).
[VOL. 64:409
2005] REVISITING THE NONINSURABLE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 443
While the earlier cases frequently pertained to automobile acci-
dents (in particular drunken driving) ,62 the expansion of punitive
damages into the spheres of products liability, civil rights, and employ-
ment disputes has raised the stakes of the debate. 6 ' For example, in
Oregon, punitive damages can be awarded in cases where "the viola-
tion of societal interests is sufficiently great and the conduct involved
is of a kind that sanctions would tend to prevent."1 64 Pursuant to such
a standard, punitive damages may be assessed for "a wide spectrum of
conduct that would impose liability not only upon automobile drivers,
but also upon business and professional persons, firms and corpora-
tions, as well as upon ordinary persons when engaged in a wide variety
of activities." '165 In the same vein, the Montana Supreme Court has
noted that 'Juries and judges typically award punitives for a broad
range of conduct.
' '1 6 6
The general consensus surrounding the standard, articulated
purposes of punitive damages-to punish and to deter-in fact masks
deep and significant disagreement both in terms of relative emphasis
of one goal over the other, as well as the exclusivity of these punitive
roles. For some time, in the academy and in legal briefs, the "retribu-
tivist" paradigm, emphasizing moral desert and punishment, has been
pitted against the "deterrence" paradigm, the law and economics in-
162. For discussion of these early cases, see Ben H. Logan, Punitive Damages in Automobile
Cases, 456 INS. L.J. 27 (1961); Comment, Damages-Intoxicated Driver-Punitive Damages, 46
IowA L. REv. 645 (1961); Theodore D. Fischer, Note, Insurance Coverage and the Punitive
Award in the Automobile Accident Suit, 19 U. Prrr. L. REv. 144 (1957); Note, Punitive Damages
and Their Possible Application in Automobile Accident Litigation, 46 VA. L. REv. 1036 (1960).
163. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347,
351 n.12 (2003) (presenting statistics, derived from the "most comprehensive data set avail-
able of punitive damages awards in civil trials," that demonstrate that punitive damages are
awarded, for example, in higher percentages of employment disputes won by plaintiffs
(12.5% to 26.8%) than the overall average for punitive awards in cases won by plaintiffs
(4.5% to 5.9%) would suggest).
164. Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 567 P.2d 1013, 1017-18 (Or. 1977) (quoting Stark-
weather v. Shaffer, 497 P.2d 358, 362 (Or. 1972)).
165. Id. at 1018 (citing punitive damages awards in cases of medical malpractice, credi-
tor's wrongful possession, wrongful arrest, and misrepresentation). Other courts have
echoed this concern. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 389 A.2d 359, 366 (Md.
1978). As the Maryland Court of Appeals reasoned:
If we were to determine that it is against public policy for one to protect himself
by insurance against exemplary damages, such a small businessman could be crip-
pled or virtually wiped out by an assessment of exemplary damages in a malicious
prosecution action where he proceeded with what he regarded as good reason to
prosecute a shoplifter but the courts found that he lacked probable cause for
such pursuit.
Id.
166. First Bank (N.A.)-Billings v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 679 P.2d 1217, 1222 (Mont.
1984).
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spired conception that punitive damages are necessary only where
compensatory damages will not adequately deter, such as where
wrongdoing is concealed and/or harms go undetected. 167 Moreover,
in addition to punishment and deterrence rationales, several states
embrace compensatory goals-either the historical role of compensat-
ing individuals for intangible injuries, 168 or else the more innovative
modem role of societal compensation. 169
Elsewhere I have argued that the expansive modem punitive
damages doctrine and practice has placed pressure upon the "individ-
ual harm paradigm," which conceives punitive damages as individually
oriented, retributive punishment.1 70 Moreover, I have argued that the
U.S. Supreme Court's latest word on the subject, State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,17' was cryptic at best. On the one
hand, the Court seemed to reassert the traditional "bilateral view" that
punitive damages should be limited to punishment for specific wrongs
inflicted on particular individual plaintiffs.' 72 In this vein, the Court
admonished that "[d] ue process does not permit courts, in the calcu-
lation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties'
hypothetical claims against a defendant under the guise of the repre-
167. Compare Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal
Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. Rav. 1393, 1451 (1993) ("[R]etribution forms the fundamental basis
of punitive damages .... Efficiency plays no role in the normative universe of punitive
damages as we conceive of it."), with A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Dam-
ages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARv. L. RaV. 869, 870 (1998) ("[P]unitive damages ordina-
rily should be awarded if, and only if, an injurer has a significant chance of escaping
liability for the harm he caused.").
168. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 438 n.11
(2001) ("Until well into the 19th century, punitive damages frequently operated to com-
pensate for intangible injuries, compensation which was not otherwise available under the
narrow conception of compensatory damages prevalent at the time."). But see Anthony J.
Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do ? Why Misunderstanding the History of Punitive Damages
Matters Today, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 163, 180-95 (2003) (rejecting the Supreme Court's
conclusion in Cooper and arguing that the historical rationale for punitives included a pun-
ishment goal).
169. See Sharkey, supra note 163 (examining the innovative concept of societal compen-
sation, i.e., the notion that one purpose of punitive damages is to compensate nonplaintiff
individuals not before the court for the harms caused by the defendant who is before the
court).
170. Id. at 359-63. The individual-retributive harm conception of punitive damages has
a close parallel in the victims' rights conception of individualized treatment that Calabresi
describes. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
171. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
172. See id. at 420 (chastising the Utah Supreme Court for having "condemned" State
Farm "for its nationwide policies rather than for the conduct directed toward the [plain-
tiffs]"); id. at 423 ("A defendant should be punished for the conduct that harmed the
plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individual or business.").
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hensibility analysis."' 73 On the other hand, the Court explicitly con-
ceded the potential relevance of harms inflicted beyond the
individual plaintiffs (in this case, extending to "harm to the people of
Utah"), at least when caused by a defendant's similar acts. 174 Attempt-
ing to reconcile these seemingly divergent views, I argued that while it
may be the case that Campbell seemingly put the brakes on nationwide
assessment of damages for widespread harms by limiting the extrater-
ritorial or out-of-state reach of punitive damages, it left open the possi-
bility of classwide assessments at the state (or more localized) level.
175
And indeed, recent history seems to have borne this out: the
modem trend ofjurors' assessments of classwide punitive damages in
single or multi-plaintiff cases has continued in Campbell's wake. Judge
Richard Posner's recent decision in Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging,
Inc. 176 is a case in point.1 77 Two plaintiffs, who were bitten by bedbugs
in an infested hotel, sued the hotel operator for negligence.' 78 The
jury awarded each plaintiff $5,000 in compensatory damages and
$186,000 in punitive damages. 179 According to Judge Posner, "[i]t is
probably not a coincidence that $5,000 + $186,000 = $191,000/191 =
$1,000: i.e., $1,000 per room in the hotel." 8 ' In other words, the jury
may have awarded damages sufficient to measure the harm not just to
the two plaintiffs, but to the other harmed guests in the bug-ridden
hotel. The court upheld the jury's punitive damages award, notwith-
standing the fact that it was 37.2 times the compensatory award-i.e.,
larger than the "single-digit ratio" strongly suggested by the Supreme
Court in Campbell'
173. Id. at 423. As I have explained elsewhere, "[tihe Court premised this due process
right on the need to cabin the 'possibility of multiple punitive damages awards for the
same conduct,' which arises because 'in the usual case nonparties are not bound by the
judgment some other plaintiff obtains.'" Sharkey, supra note 163, at 362 n.36 (quoting
Campbell, 538 U.S. at 423).
174. Campbel4 538 U.S. at 427.
175. Sharkey, supra note 163, at 350. We might then add societal roles for punitive
damages (whether compensatory or punitive) as another indicator of the demise of the
bilateral view of torts. Recall that Calabresi argued that the widespread availability of gen-
eral liability insurance demonstrated a rejection of the bilateral view. See supra text accom-
panying notes 26-27.
176. 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003).
177. For background on the Mathias case, see Jan Crawford Greenburg, Big Award in
Bug Case Stirs Debate, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 24, 2003, at 1, and Leonard Post, Victory for High-Side
Punitives, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 3, 2003, at 1.
178. Mathias, 347 F.3d at 673-74.
179. Id. at 674.
180. Id. at 678.
181. See id. at 675 (noting that Campbell did not "lay down a... single-digit-ratio rule").
In Campbel4 the Supreme Court suggested that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio
445
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I would argue that the $186,000 in punitive damages awarded to
each plaintiff is not only an attempt to punish the hotel for its miscon-
duct, or to deter it from future failure to exterminate properly, but
also-or perhaps instead-an attempt, albeit an imperfect one, to ef-
fect societal compensation. 182
C. Link to Insurability Debate
It should come as no surprise that the contours of the debate
over insurability of punitive damages might likewise change, especially
so when the nonpunitive rationales for punitive damages gain force.
What is perhaps surprising is that the correspondence between the
changing and evolving underlying purposes of punitive damages and
the policy rationales governing insurability is not stronger. Examples
of that disconnect can be found in states on both sides of the insura-
bility divide.
The clearest case for insurability would seem to be in those states
that recognize an exclusively compensatory purpose of punitive dam-
ages. In other words, when punitive damages are viewed as compensa-
tory in nature, the public policy-based objections to insurance would
seem to disappear.18 In addition, if punitive damages are compensa-
tory, policy considerations will support the insurability of those dam-
ages in order to secure compensation for victims.18 4 This appears to
be the case in Connecticut, where "punitive damages serve primarily
to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries and, thus, are properly lim-
between punitive and compensatory damages... will satisfy due process." State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
182. For an example of a similar attempt to effect societal compensation by assessing
punitive damages, see Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 92 P.3d 126 (Or. Ct. App. 2004), pet. for
review granted, 104 P.3d 601 (Or. 2004). In Williams, the court upheld a $79.5 million puni-
tive damages award-96 times the compensatory damages award-in a single-plaintiff case.
The court cited "evidence concerning other Oregon victims of defendant's decades-long
fraudulent scheme" and noted that "[plaintiff] was simply one of its many Oregon victims."
Id. at 14142. The court also concluded that "it would have been reasonable for the jury to
infer that at least 100 members of the Oregon public had been misled by defendant's
advertising scheme over a 40-year period in the same way that [plaintiff] had been misled."
Id. at 145. The Oregon Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the appeal on May 10,
2005.
183. Cf Am. Surety Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523, 525 (10th Cir. 1966) (deciding the insura-
bility question by distinguishing New Hampshire, which allows exemplary damages only for
compensatory purposes, from Kansas, which holds that punitive damages are intended to
punish and deter); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 601 N.Y.S.2d 276,
278-79 (App. Div. 1993) (basing its decision not to allow coverage for punitive damages on
the ground that the purpose of punitive damages awards under the laws of Georgia and
Texas was to punish and deter, not to compensate).
184. See supra notes 120, 123.
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ited to the plaintiff's litigation expenses less taxable costs. "185 In Con-
necticut, insurability has turned upon the distinction between
common-law punitive damages that cover litigation costs and statutory
multiple damages (e.g., double or treble damages) that have been
deemed punitive in purpose. The former are insurable; the latter are
not.18 6 These "compensatory punitive damages" states (Connecticut,
Michigan, and, on some accounts, New Hampshire and Louisiana1 87),
however, comprise a minority of the states that allow punitive damages
to be insured.
Less predictable (and thus more interesting) are the many states
that allow potential tortfeasors to purchase insurance policies to pro-
tect against punitive damages liability, even while holding fast to the
dominant view that punitive damages exist solely to punish and deter
wrongdoers. Georgia provides a particularly good illustration. A pre-
vious statutory damages provision had empowered juries in tort ac-
tions to "give additional damages to deter the wrongdoer from
repeating the trespass or as compensation for the wounded feelings of
the plaintiff."' 88 At that time, the Georgia Supreme Court deemed
punitive damages insurable.' 89 Subsequently, in 1987, the Georgia
legislature amended the provision to provide that "punitive damages
shall be awarded not as compensation to the plaintiff but solely to
185. Berry v. Loiseau, 614 A.2d 414, 435 (Conn. 1992); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-
240b (1991) (limiting the amount of punitive damages in products liability cases to two
times the amount of compensatory damages).
186. Compare St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Shernow, 610 A.2d 1281, 1286 (Conn.
1992) (permitting punitive damages insurance coverage because it would not "allow the
wrongdoer unjustly to benefit from his wrong" and the benefits would inure to "the inno-
cent victim who will be provided compensation for her injuries" (quoting Vigilant Ins. Co.
v. Kambly, 319 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982))), with Tedesco v. Md. Cas. Co., 18
A.2d 357, 359 (Conn. 1941) (holding that statutory multiple damages awarded to punish
wanton misconduct are not insurable). See infra notes 215-217 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Tedesco case).
187. See Kewin v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 55 (Mich. 1980) ("In Michi-
gan, exemplary damages are recoverable as compensation to the plaintiff, not as punish-
ment of the defendant."); Crowley v. Global Reality, Inc., 474 A.2d 1056, 1058 (N.H. 1984)
("[N]o damages are to be awarded as a punishment to the defendant or as a warning and
example to deter him and others from committing like offenses in the future. In other
words, no damages other than compensatory are to be awarded." (quoting Vratsenes v.
N.H. Auto, Inc., 289 A.2d 66, 68 (N.H. 1972))); Fagot v. Ciravola, 445 F. Supp. 342, 345
(E.D. La. 1978) ("[T]o the extent that Louisiana permits damage awards that other states
would term 'exemplary' or 'punitive,' Louisiana has relied on what may often be viewed as
the compensatory nature of even punitive damages.").
188. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5(a) (2000). This section was repealed in 1987. See id. § 51-
12-5(b) ("This Code section shall apply only to causes of action for torts arising before July
1, 1987.").
189. Greenwood Cemetery, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 232 S.E.2d 910, 913-14 (Ga.
1977).
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punish, penalize, or deter a defendant."19 ° Notwithstanding this
change in expressed legislative purpose, Georgia courts have reaf-
firmed the insurability of punitive damages."'
A similar phenomenon is at work in Texas-one of a handful of
states where the insurability issue has yet to be decided conclusively. 192
In a landmark 1994 decision, Transportation Insurance Co. v. Moriel,193
the Texas Supreme Court made clear that "l[t] he legal justification for
punitive damages is similar to that for criminal punishment"; namely,
"punitive damages are levied for the public purpose of punishment
and deterrence."194 The court could not have been more emphatic in
declaring that "[o]ur duty in civil cases, .. . like the duty of criminal
courts, is to ensure that defendants who deserve to be punished in fact
receive an appropriate level of punishment."' 95 Following Moriel, the
Texas legislature took the further step of clarifying this exclusive puni-
tive purpose by defining exemplary damages as "any damages awarded
as a penalty or by way of punishment."196 Here, then, would seem to
be the strongest case for a public policy prohibition of insurance for
punitive damages.
Instead, in a 2004 decision, a Texas federal district court held
that insurance for punitive damages does not violate public policy. 197
The court rejected plaintiffs contention, based upon Moriel, that in-
surance coverage would "thwart the policy behind punitive damages
190. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(c).
191. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Distrib. Co., 417 S.E.2d 671, 675 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
192. See Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Stebbins Five Cos., No. Civ.A. 302CV1279M, 2004 WL
210636, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2004) ("There are no Texas Supreme Court decisions
directly addressing whether an insurer may indemnify an insured from an award of puni-
tive damages . . ").
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently certified the question to the
Supreme Court of Texas. See Fairfield Ins. Co. v. Stephens Martin Paving, 381 F.3d 435
(5th Cir. 2004). The Texas Supreme Court accepted certification on August 27, 2004. The
case was argued on November 9, 2004, and, at the time this Article went to press, was still
pending.
193. 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).
194. Id. at 16-17. Some earlier cases had suggested that punitive damages might also
serve a compensatory function. E.g., Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 474-75 (Tex.
1984).
195. Morie, 879 S.W.2d at 17.
196. Act of April 11, 1995, ch. 19, sec. 1, § 41.001(5), 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 108, 109.
Prior to this Act, "exemplary damages" were defined as "any damages awarded as an exam-
ple to others, as a penalty, or by way of punishment." Id. The Act deleted "an example to
others" from this definition, such that "exemplary damages" are defined as "any damages
awarded as a penalty or by way of punishment." Id.
197. See Stebbins, 2004 WL 210636, at *4-6 (relying upon Ridgway v. Gulf Life Ins. Co.,
578 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1978)).
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awards-punishment and deterrence."'1 98 To the contrary, the court
reasoned that "punishment and deterrence may nonetheless be pro-
moted where coverage of punitive damages is permitted."1 99 Specifi-
cally, the court noted that "[w]here an insurer contracts to provide
coverage for a punitive damages award, the insurer may punish and
deter a potential insured's conduct by raising its premiums or refusing
coverage altogether. '" 20 With the subtle shift from the nature of puni-
tive damages as punishment or deterrence to a focus upon how such
goals are best achieved, courts and legislatures are given enormous
discretion in terms of deciding insurability regardless of the underly-
ing legal characterization of punitive damages.
That discretion, moreover, may exist equally on the other side of
the insurability divide. Ohio, for example, purports to align itself
squarely in the public policy prohibition camp.20 1 After reviewing the
arguments for and against insurability, the Ohio Court of Appeals, in
a 1987 decision, held that "both the legislature and the judiciary have
articulated a clear policy against the insurability of punitive dam-
ages."20 2 In a more recent decision, the court backpedaled a bit, hold-
ing that public policy prohibitions should not stand in the way when
punitive damages are awarded "without any finding of malice, ill will,
or other culpability."2 ' The court reasoned that "[p] unitive damages
198. Id. at *4.
199. Id. at *5.
200. Id. The court relied on a Texas Court of Appeals decision, Westchester Fire Insurance
Co. v. Admiral Insurance Co., which "[i]n the absence of any clear indication from either the
legislature or the supreme court on this issue.... decline [d] to hold that insurance cover-
age for punitive damages... violates the public policy of the State of Texas." Id. (quoting
Westchester, No. 2-01-227-CV, 2003 WL 21475423, at *10 (Tex. App. June 26, 2003)). After
en banc reconsideration, the Texas Court of Appeals withdrew its prior opinion, and sub-
stituted a much narrower holding. See Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 152
S.W.3d 172, 190 (Tex. App. 2004) (en banc) (declining to address "whether insurance
coverage for punitive damages currently violates this state's public policy"). The en banc
court pointed out that "[ t] he legislative change to the definition of exemplary damages (as
being solely for penalty or punishment) did not apply to causes of action [like the one
before the court] accruing before September 1, 1995." Id. at 189. And, according to the
court, "[w]hether or not the party against whom punitive damages are imposed actually
pays (or its insurance company pays) such an award is irrelevant when the purpose of the
award is to make an example of the party." Id The en banc decision was rendered while
the broader question of whether insurance coverage for punitive damages violates public
policy in Texas was pending before the Texas Supreme Court. See supra note 192.
201. See, e.g., Casey v. Calhoun, 531 N.E.2d 1348, 1350-51 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (holding
that the Ohio Legislature's enactment of OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 3937.182 evinced a legis-
lative policy against punitive damages insurance broad enough to negate the policy provi-
sion at issue in the case); supra note 92.
202. Casey, 531 N.E.2d at 1350.
203. Corinthian v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 758 N.E.2d 218, 223 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). In
Corinthian, statutory punitive damages were awarded against a nursing home "upon a show-
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which are not based on a finding of actual malice or any other state of
mind are not punishment in any traditional sense."2 4 Moreover, the
court was convinced that "there is little deterrent effect from 'punitive
damages' awarded without a finding of ill will or malice."20 5
Much hinges, then, on whether conduct is characterized as inten-
tional, willful and wanton, malicious, reckless, or negligent. But, as
Judge Gewin recognized back in the 1960s in his McNulty concur-
rence, "[t] he borderline between willful and wanton injury and injury
as the result of simple negligence, is often a hairline distinction. "'206
And that distinction has become increasingly imperceptible in mod-
ern cases. In such situations, courts and legislatures should be wary of
any broad public policy exclusion for insurance of punitive
damages.2
0 7
CONCLUSION: INSURABILITY DEBATE AS HARBINGER OF CHANGE
Thirty-five years ago, Calabresi challenged the tort system's em-
brace of individualized justice:
The fault system may have arisen in a world where one in-jurer and one victim were the most that society could handle
adequately .... But even assuming that such was the world
in which the fault system grew, it is not today's world. Today
accidents must be viewed not as incidental events linking one
victim with injurer, but as a more general societal
problem.20 8
For Calabresi, the prevalence of general liability insurance was strong
evidence that we had moved decidedly away from the bipolar view of
torts. Fast-speed forward. Now, at the beginning of the twenty-first
ing that the resident received inappropriate or inadequate medical treatment or nursing
care, without a showing of intent, malice, willfulness, or recklessness." Id. at 220.
204. Id. at 223.
205. Id.
206. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 444 (5th Cir. 1962) (Gewin,
J., concurring); see also Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tenn.
1964) (White, J., concurring) ("The line of demarcation between the allowance of punitive
damages and compensatory only is too thin and exacting .... Verdicts of juries are
unpredictable.").
207. Moreover, "[w]hen combined with the possibility that different fact finders in simi-
lar fact situations may reach differing conclusions as to the availability of punitive damages,
the argument for denial of coverage becomes difficult to sustain." First Bank (N.A.)-Bill-
ings v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 679 P.2d 1217, 1222 (Mont. 1984).
208. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 307-08. Samuel Issacharoff and John Witt
challenge further the assumption that the tort law system, as a historical matter, ever em-
braced individualized justice as its modus operandi. See Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 26,
at 1573-74.
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century, the changing and expanding roles assumed by punitive dam-
ages might provide further ammunition that juries and courts attempt
to remediate and punish harms on a societal scale. It seems particu-
larly fitting, then, at this juncture, to examine the interplay between
insurance and punitive damages.
Several insights emerge from our review of the insurability ques-
tion. First, insurance markets appear to draw boundaries different
from those drawn within traditional tort doctrine. While various tort
doctrines and public policy-based objections to punitive damages in-
surance continue to stress the particular nature or classification of
damages, the insurance market segments claims along an accidental-
intentional line that cuts across the categories of compensatory and
punitive damages. Historically, punitive damages and intentional acts
may have been a tight fit, but that alignment is strained in modern
torts.
Second, every reason exists to believe that the traditional com-
pensatory-punitive divide is eroding in the judicial system itself. As
Tennessee Supreme Court Justice White presciently recognized in his
concurring opinion in Lazenby, "[t]he line of demarcation between
the allowance of punitive damages and compensatory only is too thin
and exacting in my opinion to apply coverage in one case and deny
coverage in the other."2 °9 I leave for another day a general explora-
tion of the blurring of the compensatory-punitive divide in torts. Stra-
tegic lawyers and jurors, of course, play a key role in this blurring. But
so do courts, which can enable jurors to act or else attempt to emulate
their understandings. Thus, for example, the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals, in finding punitive damages insurable, deferred to its intuition
that jurors would expect such coverage: "[W] e strongly suspect that
the common sense of the community as a whole would expect a judg-
ment including exemplary damages to be satisfied through . . . insur-
ance policies .... It would be outraged and have substantial difficulty
in comprehending reasons for a holding to the contrary. "210
209. Lazenby, 383 S.W.2d at 7 (White, J., concurring). Justice White based his view on
the fact that "[v]erdicts ofjuries are unpredictable." Id. Justice White pointed to McNulty
as an example:
In the McNulty case insurance protection was disallowed in order that the insured
might be punished for his wrongdoing and to deter him and others from similar
conduct. Yet, on identical facts, another jury might have returned an award lim-
ited to compensatory damages only in which case the wrongdoer would be fully
protected under provisions of a policy such as here.
Id.
210. First Nat'l Bank v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 389 A.2d 359, 366 (Md. 1978).
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The bottom line is that blanket public policy prohibitions against
insurance for punitive damages no longer make sense. Pure "inten-
tional" wrongdoing, of the sort that inevitably involves moral hazard,
will continue to be excluded from coverage by the insurance industry.
It is true that courts, on the whole, have been "reluctant to find an
intentional act unless it is blatantly clear that the actor intended to
cause the harm as distinguished from intending to perform the
act."2"' But if the insurance industry wishes to restrict its policies fur-
ther, it can explicitly exclude punitive damages.212 The trend towards
ever-increasing insurability of punitive damages signals something im-
portant about the shifting nature of the roles assumed by such dam-
ages: an evolutionary process that is stifled by ad hoc judicial or
legislative public policy-based objections.
It must, of course, be recognized that a switch of focus from the
nature or classification of damages to the intentional (i.e., expected
or intended) nature of the underlying conduct is fraught with its own
set of difficulties. Here I return to Calabresi's example of drunken
driving, a clear case in his mind for "noninsurable penalties."21 3 Cala-
bresi may have unwittingly chosen the most contentious example pos-
sible.21 4 Perhaps he was influenced by the approach taken in his
home state. In a leading 1941 case, Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that the statutorily authorized
double or treble damages allowable in motor vehicle accidents were
penalties "imposed upon an offending driver as punishment for a vio-
lation of the statute which has the aspects of a wrong to the public
rather than to the individual." 21 5 For this reason-like Calabresi's
noninsurable tort fines and penalties-the court held that these dam-
ages were not insurable. In the court's words, "A policy which permit-
211. 1 KIRCHER & WISEMAN, supra note 15, § 7:04, at 7-19. Courts may read the inten-
tional act exclusion especially narrowly in cases where a plaintiff would otherwise be left
entirely without compensation. See supra notes 120, 123. In other words, where the com-
pensatory (as opposed to punitive) rationale dominates for the award of damages, any
sharp line premised upon intentionality may inevitably waver.
212. On this account, the statutory approaches of Hawaii and Montana may have it ex-
actly backwards. Recall that these states would exclude coverage for punitive damages un-
less it is specifically included in an insurance contract. See supra note 93. The better
approach might be to presume coverage unless expressly excluded, In this way, it would
operate like an information-forcing penalty default rule. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97
(1989) (describing penalty defaults as a method to encourage parties to a contract to pro-
duce information).
213. THE COSTS OF AccIDENTS, supra note 1, at 269.
214. Indeed, the "procoverage and anti-public policy trend appears to be the strongest
as to automobile insurance." 1 KIRCHER & WISEMAN, supra note 15, § 7:14, at 7-76.
215. 18 A.2d 357, 359 (Conn. 1941).
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ted an insured to recover from the insurer fines imposed for a
violation of a criminal law would certainly be against public policy."
216
By characterizing these statutory damages as "fines" and "penalties,"
the court assured the conclusion that they were not insurable.
21 7
By contrast, other courts consider drunken driving a paradigm of
"gross, reckless or wanton negligence," which, unlike a "purposeful or
intentional tort," does not "carry the degree of culpability that should
foreclose the right to insurance coverage.2 1 8 Recall that Lazenby too
involved a drunken driver, and the Tennessee Supreme Court was not
persuaded that prohibiting insurance coverage "would necessarily ac-
complish the result of deterring [drunken drivers] in their wrongful
conduct.
2 19
As these cases make clear, the insurability debate resurfaces in a
different guise-i.e., whether the conduct is "intentional" in the
moral hazard sense that it was expected or intended by the insured.
2
The debate also highlights a new dividing line: that between
fines or penalties 221 and punitive damages. In The Costs of Accidents,
Professor Calabresi made no distinction between the two; indeed, at
the time, punitive damages may have had more in common with pen-
alties than with damages. But punitive damages today encompass a
much broader territory. They may best be characterized as a curious
amalgam of penalties and damages, satisfying both remedial and puni-
tive purposes. The insurability debate must wrestle with these ques-
tions, in old and new realms.
216. Id.
217. For similar reasoning, see Reimer v. Delisio, 442 A-2d 731, 736 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1982) (rejecting the view that the phrase "tort fine" in a state no-fault automobile liability
statute encompassed common-law punitive damages).
218. Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227, 233 (W. Va. 1981); see also Abbie Uriguen
Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 511 P.2d 783, 789 (Idaho 1973);
Anthony v. Frith, 394 So. 2d 867, 868 (Miss. 1981).
219. 383 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tenn. 1964). It may well be, for example, that, even in the face of
knowledge that driving drunk risks serious harm or death, many people continue to drive
drunk because they nonetheless do not believe these risks will materialize for them.
220. This debate, moreover, carries over as well to the interpretation of "criminal act"
language that some insurers have added to their standard intentional act exclusions. See
ToM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 496-505 (2003)
(noting that courts have recently disagreed over whether the criminal act exclusion focuses
only on the criminality of the act regardless of actual intent, or instead, requires that the
harm "reasonably be expected" from the act-very likely a manifestation of the moral haz-
ard concern).
221. According to two leading punitive damages commentators, "[t] he terms fine and
penalty are not identical in meaning, but are often confused. The term penalty includes all
punishment of whatever kind ... [whereas] a fine is a 'sum of money exacted of a person
guilty of a crime. . . .'" 1 KIRCHER & WISEMAN, supra note 15, § 7:23, at 7-118 to 7-119.
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A key issue for the future concerns the scope of insurance for
statutory multiple damages.222 Already, several courts have distin-
guished such statutory damages from common-law punitive damages
in order to hold them insurable, while upholding public policy-based
objections to insuring punitive damages.223 Courts have attempted to
classify statutory damages as either remedial (and thus insurable) or
else punitive (and thus not insurable) .224 But will such a distinction
hold up? In fact, like common-law punitive damages, statutory multi-
ple damages may inhabit both spheres. Nevertheless, a court's charac-
terization as one or the other affects the insurability determination. 225
One thing remains certain, however: the insurability debate-as
it continues to play out in the realm of punitive damages and as it
confronts the realm of statutory damages-has decades later now
moved beyond Calabresi's conception of noninsurable tort fines and
penalties in The Costs of Accidents. The multifaceted remedial and pe-
nal roles assumed by common-law and statutory damages inevitably
222. See 1 id. § 7:27, at 7-128 ("An increased frequency of such cases is to be anticipated,
since legislatures are multiplying legislative prohibitions against individual conduct as well
as providing a civil remedy in the form of statutorily imposed damages.").
223. E.g., Cieslewicz v. Mut. Servs. Cas. Ins. Co., 267 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Wis. 1978) (re-jecting the application of the state's public policy prohibition against insuring punitive
damages in a case involving treble damages for violation of a dog-bite statute); see alsoWojciak v. N. Package Corp., 310 N.W.2d 675, 680 (Minn. 1981) (finding punitive damagesfor wrongful discharge under the state workers' compensation statute insurable, notwith-
standing the general public policy prohibition against insuring punitive damages, on theground that, "although styling the multiple damages authorized therein as 'punitive dam-
ages,' [they are awarded] . . . not only to punish employers guilty of retaliatory discharges
and to deter such conduct by others, but also to afford redress to employees who lose their
employment as the consequence of retaliatory dismissal").
224. Compare, e.g., Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 910 (3d Cir. 1991)(suggesting that RICO's treble damages are "punitive" in nature), with, e.g., Convent of theVisitation Sch. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 707 F. Supp. 412, 416 (D. Minn. 1989) (stating that treble
damages under the Minnesota Human Rights Act are "compensatory" in nature).
225. Its characterization may likewise affect whether or not the entire apparatus of theSupreme Court's punitive damages excessiveness jurisprudence applies. Compare Parker v.Time Warner Entm't Co., 331 F.3d 13, 22 (2d Cir. 2003) (suggesting that the Supreme
Court's due process review might apply where the combination of statutory damages with
the class action mechanism "may expand the potential statutory damages sb far beyond the
actual damages suffered that the statutory damages come to resemble punitive damages"),
with Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455, 460 (D. Md. 2004)("The Gore guideposts do not limit the statutory damages here because of the difficulties in
assessing compensatory damages in this case. Statutory damages exist in part because ofthe difficulties in proving-and in providing compensation for-actual harm in copyrightinfringement actions." (citation omitted)), appeal docketed, No. 04-1433 (4th Cir. Apr. 12,
2004) (oral argument heard Mar. 16, 2005); see also J. Cam Barker, Note, Grossly ExcessivePenalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-Sharing: The Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum
Statutory Damages for Copyright Infringement, 83 TEX. L. REV. 525, 536 (2004) (arguing that
substantive due process "restricts the aggregation of minimum statutory damages for copy-
right infringement in the file-sharing context").
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change the terms of the debate. But all this change too may, nonethe-
less, be embraced by Calabresi's parting words in The Costs of Accidents.
"change is virtually inevitable, whether it is made consciously or
not."22
6
226. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 316.
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APPENDIX: INSURABILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES: 50 STATE SURVEY
State Statutory or Common-Law Case Authority
INSURABLE
(IA = Intentional Act Exclusion)
A. Statute
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10-240 (2001) (effective
1987) (coverage must be specifically included)
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-15-317(1) (2003) (effective
1987) (coverage must be specifically included)
IA: Safeco Ins. Co. v. Liss, 16 P.3d 399 (Mont.
2000)
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 681A.095 (Michie 2003)
(effective 1995)
IA: (same statute)
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-227 (Michie 2002) (effective
1986)
IA: (same statute)
B. Highest State Court
Alabama Am. Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Werfel, 164 So. 383 (Ala.
1935)
IA: Fid.-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 146 So.
387 (Ala. 1933)
Alaska State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 26 P.3d
1074 (Alaska 2001)
Arizona Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 502 P.2d
522 (Ariz. 1972)
IA: Cont'l Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 772 P.2d 6 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1988)
Arkansas S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 440 S.W.2d
582 (Ark. 1969)
IA: (same case)
Connecticut St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Shernow, 610
A.2d 1281 (Conn. 1992)
IA: (same case)
Delaware Whalen v. On-Deck, Inc., 514 A.2d 1072 (Del. 1986)
Georgia Greenwood Cemetery, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co..
232 S.E.2d 910 (Ga. 1977)
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Idaho Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. U.S. Fire
Ins. Co., 511 P.2d 783 (Idaho 1973)
Iowa Skyline Harvestore Sys., Inc. v. Centennial Ins. Co.,
331 N.W.2d 106 (Iowa 1983)
IA: Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. Jungling, 654
N.W.2d 530 (Iowa 2002)
Kentucky Cont'l Ins. Cos. v. Hancock, 507 S.W.2d 146 (Ky.
1973)
IA: (same case)
Maryland First Nat'l Bank v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 389 A.2d 359
(Md. 1978)
Mississippi Anthony v. Frith, 394 So. 2d 867 (Miss. 1981)
New Mexico Baker v. Armstrong, 744 P.2d 170 (N.M. 1987)
North Mazza v. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 319 S.E.2d 217 (N.C.
Carolina 1984)
Oregon Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 567 P.2d 1013 (Or.
1977)
IA: (same case)
South Carroway v. Johnson, 139 S.E.2d 908 (S.C. 1965)
Carolina
Tennessee Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383
S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1964)
Vermont American Prot. Ins. Co. v. McMahan, 562 A.2d 462(Vt. 1989)
West Virginia Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va.
1981)
IA: (same case)
Wisconsin Brown v. Maxey, 369 N.W.2d 677 (Wis. 1985)
Wyoming Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 682 P.2d
975 (Wyo. 1984)
C. Lower State & Federal Court
Michigan Meijer, Inc. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 826 F. Supp.
241 (W.D. Mich. 1993), aff'd, No. 94-1152, 1995 WL
433592 (6th Cir. July 21, 1995)
Texas Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Stebbins Five Cos. No.
Civ.A 302CV1279M, 2004 WL 210636 (N.D. Tex.
Jan. 27, 2004)
IA: Decorative Ctr. v. Employers Cas. Co., 833
S.W.2d 257 (Tex. App. 1992)
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NOT INSURABLE
(VL= Vicarious Liability Exception)
A. Statute
Ohio OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3937.182 (Anderson 2002)(effective 1988) (prohibiting coverage for punitive
damages in automobile, casualty, and liability
insurance policies); Casey v. Calhoun, 531 N.E.2d
1348 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (interpreting statute)
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-20-101 (2001) (effective
1985)
B. Highest State Court
California PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 975 P.2d
652 (Cal. 1999)
IA: CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1993) (effective
1935)
VL: Arenson v. Nat'l Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co., 286
P.2d 816 (Cal. 1955)
Colorado Lira v. Shelter Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 514 (C61o. 1996)
Florida United States Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bould, 437 So.
2d 1061 (Fla. 1983)
VL: (same case)
Kansas Flint Hills Rural Elec. Coop. Ass'n v. Federated
Rural Elec. Ins. Corp., 941 P.2d 374 (Kan. 1997)
VL: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2, 115 (2001) (effective
1984)
Minnesota Wojciak v. N. Package Corp., 310 N.W.2d 675
(Minn. 1981)
VL: Perl v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 345
N.W.2d 209 (Minn. 1984)
New York Soto v. State Farm Ins. Co., 635 N.E.2d 1222 (N.Y.
1994)
Oklahoma Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.,
621 P.2d 1155 (Okla. 1980)
VL: (same case)
C. Lower State & Federal Court
Illinois Beaver v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 420 N.E.2d 1058
(Ill. App. Ct. 1981)
VL: Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 245 N.E.2d 124(Ill. App. Ct. 1969)
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Indiana Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 420 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ind. 1976)
VL: (same case)
Missouri Heartland Stores, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co., 815 S.W.2d
39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991)
New Jersey Johnson & Johnson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 667
A.2d 1087 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995)
No VL: (same case)
Pennsylvania Esmond v. Liscio, 224 A.2d 793 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1966)
VL: Butterfield v. Giuntoli, 670 A.2d 646 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1996)
UNDECIDED OR DECIDED ONLY IN LIMrrED CoNTExrs
Maine Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353 (Me. 1985);
Braley v. Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co., 440 A.2d 359 (Me.
1982) (not insurable in uninsured motorist (UIM)
context)
VL: Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hills, 345 F.
Supp. 1090 (D. Me. 1972)
North Continental Cas. Co. v. Kinsey, 499 N.W.2d 574
Dakota (N.D. 1993) (under factual circumstances presented,
under express terms of policy, insurer had to pay
for punitive damages, but insurer had right of
indemnification against insured pursuant to
statutory intentional act exclusion, since loss
resulted from a willful act)
IA: N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-32-04 (2002)
(effective 1985)
Rhode Island Allen v. Simmons, 553 A.2d 541 (R.I. 1987) (not
insurable in automobile context)
South Dakota Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Wyant, 474 N.W.2d 514 (S.D.
1991)
District of Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Title Guar. Co., 520 F.2d
Columbia 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
No COMMoN-lAw PUNrrIVE DAMAGES
Louisiana Crane v. Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc., 743 So.
2d 780 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (punitive damages
permitted only where authorized by statute); Sharp
v. Daigre, 555 So. 2d 1361 (La. 1990) (insurable in
UIM context); Fagot v. Ciravola, 445 F. Supp. 342
(E.D. La. 1978) (insurable for violations of federal
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civil rights statutes)
IA: Baltzar v. Williams, 254 So. 2d 470 (La. Ct.
App. 1971)
Massachusetts Int'l Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 443 N.E.2d 1308 (Mass.
1983) (punitive damages permitted only where
authorized by statute); Santos v. Lumbermen's Mut.
Cas. Co., 556 N.E.2d 983 (Mass. 1990) (not
insurable in UIM context)
Nebraska Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 443
N.W.2d 566 (Neb. 1989) (punitive damages
prohibited by state constitution)
New N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (1997) (effective
Hampshire 1986) (punitive damages permitted only where
authorized by statute); Am. Home Assurance Co. v.
Fish, 451 A.2d 358 (N.H. 1982) (insurable if
assessed against municipalities)
Washington Stanard v. Bolin, 565 P.2d 94 (Wash. 1977)
(punitive damages permitted only where authorized
by statute); Fluke Corp. v. Hartford Accident &Indem. Co., 34 P.3d 809 (Wash. 2001) (insurance
for punitive damages does not violate the public
policy of Washington)
IA: Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Cohen, 881 P.2d
1001 (Wash. 1994)
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